Summary:
In the Introduction (The Democratic Age), the author argues that democratization has occurred in many areas (politics, economics, culture, violence [terror], technology) over the last century especially. The democratic idea is central to the modern world and leads to breaking down hierarchies and empowering individuals. He then distinguishes democracy from "liberal constitutionalism," the former being merely a process for selecting government, the latter about government's goals. The latter:
refers to the tradition, deep in Western history, that seeks to protect an individual's autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source - state, church, or society. The term marries two closely connected ideas. It is liberal [i.e. 19th century classical liberal, not modern American liberal] because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with the Greeks and Romans, that emphasizes individual liberty. It is constitutional because it places the rule of law at the center of politics. Constitutional liberalism developed in Western Europe and the United States as a defense of an individual's right to life and property and the freedoms of religion and speech. To secure these rights, it emphasized checks on the power of government, equality under the law, impartial courts and tribunals, and the separation of church and state. In almost all of its variants, constitutional liberalism argues that human beings have certain natural (or 'inalienable') rights and that governments must accept a basic law, limiting its own powers, to secure them. Thus in 1215 at Runnymede, England's barons forced the king to limit his own authority. In the American colonies these customs were made explicit, and in 1638 the town of Hartford adopted the first written constitution in modern history. In 1789 the American Constitution created a formal framework for the new nation. In 1975 Western nations set standards of behavior even for nondemocratic regimes. Magna Carta, the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, the American Constitution, and the Helsinki Final Act are all expressions of constitutional liberalism (19-20).
The author says America's civil society is wearing thin. While our laws and rights are firmly established, the "less-formal constraints," the "inner stuffing of liberal democracy" are disappearing. He gives as examples the US Congress, political parties, professions, clubs, and associations, all of which he claims were once hierarchical, closed and undemocratic in structure but are succumbing to democratization, thus imperiling civil society. Ironically, as Congress has become more responsive, open, democratic (i.e. listens to the people more) (and dysfunctional), it is respected less and less by the American people.
"This book is a call for self-control, for a restoration in the balance between democracy and liberty. It is not an argument against democracy. But it is a claim that there can be such a thing as too much democracy - too much of an emphatically good thing. The essence of liberal democratic politics is the construction of a rich, complex social order, not one dominated by a single idea. America's founding fathers, for example, sought to create such a pluralistic society when many believed that a single religious ideology should dominate societies. Democracy is also a single ideology, and, like all such templates, it has its limits" (26).
1) A Brief History of Human Liberty
The central theme of this chapter is that "liberty came to the West centuries before democracy" (31). The author sees the seed of the Western separation of church and state in Constantine's move in 324 AD from Rome to Byzantium (renamed Constantinople). Although he moved with him the entire political seat of the Roman Empire, he did not move the Bishop of Rome. From them on, sovereignty was contested in the West (vs. the East, where the state reigned). Zakaria acknowledges that "the rise of the Christian church is, in my view, the first important source of liberty in the West - and hence the world." This is part of a key paradox, that "liberty in the West was born of a series of power struggles - between church and state, lord and king, Protestant and Catholic, business and the state ... producing greater and greater pressures for individual liberty" (31).
"Some might contest this emphasis on the Christian Church, pointing fondly to ancient Greece as the seedbed of liberty. They will think of Pericles' famous funeral oration, delivered in 431 BC ... but [this is] part fantasy. Ancient Greece was an extraordinary culture, fertile in philosophy, science and literature. It was the birthplace of democracy and some of its associated ideas, but these were practiced in only a few, small city-states for at most a hundred years and died with the Macedonian conquest of Athens in 338 BC. ... [although it later inspired democrats] it left no tangible or institutional influences on politics in Europe" (31). Also, Greek liberty meant only (male) participation in governance, and implied no individual protection from state power (e.g. freedoms of expression, association, worship, due process, ...). The power of the Greek assembly was unlimited (e.g. recall the execution of Socrates, ordered by the assembly). Democratic, yes; liberal, no.
"Whereas Greece gave the world philosophy, literature, poetry, and art, Rome gave us the beginnings of limited government and the rule of law. The Roman Republic, with its divided government (3 branches), election of officials to limited terms, and emphasis on equality under law has been a model for governments ever since" (32). The "gaping hole" was that, in practice, the ruling elite was exempt. What was lacking were "institutions within society whose strength is independent of the state. The West found such a countervailing force in the Catholic Church" (33). Thomas Hobbes called the RCC "the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire sitting crowned upon [its] grave." "The RCC was the first major institution in history that was independent of temporal authority and willing to challenge it. By doing this it cracked the ediface of state power, and in nooks and crannies individual liberty began to grow" (34). "The church gained power in the West for a simple reason: after the decline of the Roman Empire, it never again faced a single emperor of Europe ... a few tried - Charlemagne, Charles V, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm, and Hitler. All were thwarted, most fairly quickly" (35-6). The author says part of the credit goes to Europe's mountains and rivers, which allowed regional diversity (people, ideas, art, technology) and competition, avoiding centralization while "producing innovation and efficiency in political organization, military technology, and economic policy" (36).
On Lords vs. Kings, Zakaria quotes Guido Ruggiero (from The History of European Liberalism, Oxford, 1927 "wonderful book, deserves to be a classic") as saying "without the effective resistance of particular privileged classes, the monarchy would have created nothing but a people of slaves" (37), which is exactly what happened in most of the rest of the world (then and now).
On Rome vs. Reform, Luther was lucky in that newly invented printing presses spread his ideas thoughout Europe before the RCC could squelch them. Zakaria: "Luther was not a liberal ... [more like] a fundamentalist ... attacking" the RCC from the theological right. "Some have said ... [the Reformation] illustrates the old maxim that religious freedom is the product of two equally pernicious fanaticisms, each canceling the other out" (40). While downgrading most of the Protestant "sects" as "even more puritanical than Lutheranism," he sees their main contribution as being "part of the broader story of liberty" (unintended by them) in opposing papal authority and, by implication, all religious hierarchy (thus countering the immense power of the RCC). He acknowledges that "modern science [based on challenging authority and dogma] owes an unusual debt to 16th century religious zealots" (41). Kings and princes used Protestantism as "an excuse to wrest power away from the increasingly arrogant Vatican, something they were looking to do anyway" (41). The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) "laid to rest the idea that Europe was one great Christian community - 'Christendom' - governed spiritually by the RCC and temporally by the holy Roman emperor. The future belonged to the state" (42).
Unfortunately, the state was not to be trusted in guarding liberty. By the 17th century, European states were dominating other centers of power (with the important exception of England, whose Parliament bested the monarchy after the Glorious Revolution of 1688). He admits that, although Enlightenment ideas about "rationalizing and modernizing government" (Voltaire, Diderot) were sold as being good for liberty, their effect was to strengthen central authority (43).
'Enlightened absolutism,' as it was later called, had some progressive elements about it. Rulers such as Frederick II of Prussia, Catherine II of Russia, and Joseph II of Austria tolerated religious dissent, enacted legal reforms, and lavished money and attention on artists, musicians, and writers (which might help explain the good press they received). But the shift in power weakened the only groups in society capable of checking royal authority and excess [i.e. aristocrats, local and regional authorities]. Liberty now depending on the largesse of the ruler. When under pressure from abroad or at home, even the most benign monarch - and his not-so-benign successors - abandoned liberalization and squashed dissent. By the end of the 18th century, with war, revolution, and domestic rebellion disturbing the tranquility of Europe, enlightened absolutism became more absolutist than enlightened.
(scary question: is this what's happening with Iraq (pressure from abroad) and centralization of power in Washington?)
Both Cardinal Richelieu and the "Sun King" Louis XIV were skilled centralizers, and the key error of the French Revolution was to further centralize power in Paris (it finally destroyed landed aristocracy, which had been crippled under Richelieu and Louis, and weakened the church, local lords, parishes, and banks). Another Frenchman, Montesquieu, admired England and was first to explicitly identify a key ingredient of liberal rule, the separation of powers (between king, aristocrats [House of Lords], and commoners [House of Commons])
Finally, on business (or, more generally, civil society) vs. the centralized state (political society), the author states that if church/state, king/lord and Catholic/Protestant struggles "cracked open the door for individual liberty, capitalism blew the walls down" (45). Its origins seem to be in the recognition that "property belongs to the family, sovereignty to the prince" (46). Commerce, frozen during the Middle Ages, by the 14th century was again thriving in port cities, later to spread inland. The key to where it thrived was effective protection of property rights (probably learned as a result of the diverse experimentation mentioned before).
"The number of titled nobles in Britain was always tiny: fewer than 200 by ... [1800]. But beneath them lay a broad class ... the 'English gentry' ... [which] drew its prestige and power from business ... the 3 most powerful British prime ministers of the 19th century - Robert Peel, William Gladstone, and Benjamin Disraeli - all came from the ranks of the gentry" (47-8). "Despite the rise of capitalism, limited government, property rights, and constitutionalism across much of Europe by the 18th century, England was seen as unique" (48).
Driving home the point that democracy must follow liberal constitutionalism, Zakaria notes that "By the early 19th century in the UK and the US, for the most part, individual liberty flourished and equality under law ruled. But neither country was a democracy. Before the Reform Act of 1832, 1.8% of the adult population of the UK was eligible to vote. After the law that rose to 2.7%. After further widening the franchise in 1867, 6.4% could vote, and after 1884, 12.1%. Only in 1930, once women were fully enfranchised, did the UK meet today's standard for being democratic: universal adult suffrage. ... The US was [similar] ... In 1824 ... 5% of adult Americans cast a ballot in the presidential election. That number rose dramatically as the Jacksonian revolution spread and property qualifications were mostly eliminated. But not until the eve of the Civil War could it even be said that every white man in the US had the right to vote. Blacks were enfranchised in theory in 1870, but in fact not until a century later in the South. Women got the vote in 1920" (50-1).
The path to liberty was closest to "ideal" in England and America, but other Western nations followed in a more "jerky and bloody fashion ... [most] by the late 1940s and almost all the rest ... since 1989 ... [why?] all Western countries shared a history ... featur[ing] ... a constitional liberal tradition" (51). Rejecting the cultural or racial explanations, the author concludes "the West's real advantage is that its history led to the creation of institutions and practices that, although in no sense bound up with Western genes, are hard to replicate from scratch in other societies. But it can be done" (55). Hmmm, he doesn't give any credit to the Judeo-Christian tradition. Its all just about getting the politics and economics right.
He emphasizes that the right sequence is capitalism and rule of law first, then democracy later. He notes that the most successful developing countries were authoritarian (e.g. Singapore, Taiwan, S. Korea, Chile), and that those that jumped to democracy too fast ended in dictatorship (confounding Western intellectuals). He reminds us that our own history includes plenty of lack of democracy, voter fraud, cronyism, corruption, nepotism, so its unfair to judge other countries only by our current standards. British imperialism planted constitutionalism and capitalism, while French did not, prefering early democracy (which led to tyranny in each case in northern Africa).
2) The Twisted Path
This chapter documents the "complications produced by premature democratization" (58). His first example is 1900 Vienna. "In the 1860s and 1870s only the rich and the educated middle class voted in Austria, and their great causes were free speech, constitutionalism, and economic liberalism. Vienna's famed cosmopolitan and progressive character was a product of its limited franchise. In the 1880s and 1890s the electorate was broadened - ironically, at the urging of liberals - to allow most adult males to vote, and the country's atmosphere soon changed. The newly empowered workers and peasants were uninterested in the civic reforms of the bourgeoisie and easily swayed by the fiery rhetoric of socialists (... workers) or ultra-nationalists (... peasants). [Karl] Lueger brilliantly constructed a program that combined both nationalist and communist impulses - calling it Christian socialism. Adolf Hitler" (60) was deeply affected and the later Nazism strongly resembled this mix. These were not isolated examples. "Across Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, liberalism was under siege from mass politics. Usually the latter won ... In France, the tradition of antimonarchical liberalism (republicanism) grew strong, particularly after 1871. But it came under relentless attack from both the left (by socialists) and the right (by monarchists, aristocrats, and the church). A few decades later [see The Strange Death of Liberal England], even the United Kingdom, the birthplace and stronghold of modern liberal politics, saw its once-great Liberal Party fade into irrelevance, squeezed out by the more radical Labor Party and the more traditional Conservatives. As democracy expanded, the moderate, liberal agenda of individual rights, free-market economics, and constitutionalism [and Empire in Britain?] withered before the gut appeal of communism, religion, and nationalism" (61).
Both Bismarck in Germany and Disraeli (Conservative PM) in Britain supported and used the new mass politics to pit the reliably conservative, pro-monarchical masses against urban liberals, in Germany "using raw appeals to nationalism and employing all the symbols of patriotism at their disposal [scare tactics, divisiveness, demonizing Catholics and socialists as 'enemies of the Reich', militarism, defining national interest in expansive, aggressive ways]. It worked: they always won. In fact even the middle class split, some allying with conservatives' calls for pride in the fatherland while others stayed true to their liberal roots ... the result was a series of irresponsible policies, wildly popular at home, that were partly responsible for plunging Europe into" WWI (62) [Yikes, is some of this happening in the USA now? Well, modern liberals are NOT classical liberals (conservatives are today more like the latter) and do seem to hate and blame America first, but it DOES make one think!].
Answering "why wasn't Germany England?", the author notes Germany lacked "the economic and political independence of its bourgeoisie" (63). In England, the bourgiosie had taken root and taken over, while in Germany it had been jump-started and was still beholden to the preindustrial, feudal ruling elite. Similarly, France had "traditions of a strong state and a weak civil society" (64). The Jacobins transfered intact the absolute power of the King to "the People" and were "the first example in modern history of illiberal democracy" (65).
The author gives the suprisingly reliable predictive formula that only countries whose per capita national income (i.e. GDP) is above $3000 (in 2000 US$) should even attempt democratization (highly resilient above $6000). Why is wealth good for liberty? Because economic development produces 2 key ingredients: private sector indepedence from the state (i.e. civil society) and rule of law (enforced by the state's bargaining with these entities). In fact, in allowing the economic liberty required for growth, autocrats have often unintentionally unleashed eventual political liberalization as well (think China). Interestingly, only earned wealth counts, not resource-derived wealth (e.g. Persian Gulf sheikdoms, Nigeria, Venezuela), which does not force governments (in order to benefit themselves) to develop a framework for market discipline and growth.
The author makes 2 points sobering for libertarian sympathizers. First, capitalism depends upon a well-functioning state to work (primarily to protect property rights). Where government is weak (e.g. Africa), you find violent anarchy, not free-market paradise. Second, sometimes land reform (i.e. massive wealth redistribution from feudal landholders to peasant landworkers) is needed to bring these dead assets into a new market economy, replacing a backward peasant society (although it sounds vaguely Marxist and has often been advocated by left-wingers) (think Homestead Act in USA).
Promising candidates for liberalization (based on GDP and lack of easy resource wealth): Mexico, Romania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Malaysia, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Iran and, perhaps most importantly, China.
3) Illiberal Democracy
Here the author discusses Russia ("Russia and China are the 2 most important countries in the world that are not liberal democracies" 91). China is liberalizing economically, but not much politically, while Russia initially pursued mostly political reforms (glasnost), only later enacting economic ones (perestroika). Unfortunately, the latter mostly haven't worked yet (i.e. freedoms secure in theory, but not in practice). The author suggests that China's is the better method to achieve long-term success. Because Russia has been so resource-rich, it was never forced to create a framework for real economic growth, which requires effective and fair political (including taxing) institutions. Instead of bribing the citizens (like Saudi Arabia) to keep them in line (and from rebelling against their illegitimacy), Russia terrorized them. Yeltsin was right to battle anti-reform forces, but he erred in not positively building/strengthening replacement institutions (e.g. his 1993 constitution "is a disaster, creating a weak parliament, a dependent judiciary, and an out-of-control presidency ... [also] he did not found a political party ... [which] are the mechanism through which people in modern societies express, reconcile, and institutionalize their moral and political values ... Putin has strengthened ... [this] superpresidency" 93-4) undermining regional authorities, oligarchs and independent media, all with the support of the people. This is subverting both the rule of law (law is being used as a political weapon) and the separation of powers.
This voter-supported autocratic path (strong executive, weak legislature and judiciary) is also familiar in Latin America, Africa and central Asia, e.g. Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (also plagued by abundant natural resources) and Gaidar Aliyev in Azerbaijan. "Naturally, illiberal democracy runs along a spectrum, from modest offenders such as Argentina to near-tyrannies such as Kazakstan, with countries such as Ukraine and Venezuela in between" (99). While the Economist believes democracy is a good route to constitutional liberalism, it can and often does lead to dictatorship. While the jury is still out on Musharraf of Pakistan, he has pursued radical liberalizing reforms that would have been impossible for an elected politician.
John Stuart Mill opened his classic, On Liberty, by noting the tendency of voters in a democracy to question the need for limiting government power. After all, they reason, it represents their own will. Checks are balance of powers both horizontal (3 branches) and vertical (regional, local govts, private business, media, universities). Don't confuse strong government with effective government. "The key test of a government's legitimacy is tax collection" (104). Also, decentralization helps enforce limitation on govt power.
"If the first source of abuse in a democratic system comes from elected autocrats, the second comes from the people themselves" (Tyranny of the Majority, 105). Using India to illustrate this, he says "in recent decades, India has become ... more democratic ... [but also, and relatedly] less tolerant, less secular, less law-abiding, less liberal" (106). In the early days of Indian independence after 1947, India was controlled by the Congress party, led by Nehru (PM 1947-62). Nehru had been trained to be an English gentleman. "His worldview was that of a left-wing British intellectual circa 1940" (107). He was "deeply respectful of liberal institutions and traditions, such as the prerogatives of parliament and the press ... independent judiciary ... secularism and religious tolerance" (107). Unfortunately, later leaders like Indira Gandhi "pursued populist policies that were often unconstitutional and certainly illiberal, such as nationalizing banks and abolishing the rights of India's princes" (108). Later slippage within Congress Party and increasing competition by other parties (often based on raw appeals to race, class, religion) has further weakened these liberal ideals, including even challenges to an independent judiciary, a free press and religious tolerance (e.g. most prominent; Hindu fundamentalist BJP party, which organized the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya and seeks to "Hinduize" India, whenever its in political trouble it stokes religious conflict). Growing problems include religious intolerance, massive corruption (e.g. court packing, cronyism), disregard for the rule of law ("bandit democracy" 109).
Its a mistake to assume democracy always leads to ethnic harmony. The author also questions the currently popular assertion (originally posed by Kant about republics) that democracies never go to war with each other (American Civil War? Are nukes a better explanation? Maybe due to small number of democracies and wars recently). "Michael Doyle, the leading scholar on the subject, confirms in his 1997 book Ways of War and Peace that without constitutional liberalism, democracy itself has no peace-inducing qualities" (116). Indeed, keen observers have associated popular rule with aggression (Thucydides), imperialism (Machiavelli) and ethnic cleansing (Doyle). Examples are "Napolean III's France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Taisho Japan to the more recent Armenia and Azerbaijan and the former Yugoslavia" (117).
The author cites 1998 Indonesia as an example of flawed theory leading to flawed practice. The IMF and US Govt. helped force out the dictator Suharto (flawed, but orderly, secular, economically fairly liberal) in the hope of igniting democracy (though the country was not ready due to '3 strikes' 1) overdependence on natural resources, 2) no legitimate political institutions, 3) low per capita income ($2650)). The result was 50% GDP contraction "wiping out a generation of economic progress and pushing more than 20 million people below the poverty line" (117) and the rise of Islamic fundamentalist leaders.
4) The Islamic Exception
"The Arab rulers of the Middle East are autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed. But they are still more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic than what would likely replace them" (i.e. Islamic fundamentalists, 120). The exception is that in most countries, the dissidents agitate for change in a liberal direction, but in the Middle East, they advocate the opposite. "The Arab world today is trapped between autocratic states and illiberal societies" (121). Whereas in the West, liberalism produced democracy, which produced liberalism; in the Islamic world, repression produces radicalism, which produces more repression, leading to dictatorship vs. terrorism, accompanied by "economic paralysis, social stagnation, and intellectual bankruptcy" (122).
Why has this happened? Bin Laden and Pat Robertson (and Jerry Falwell, Franklin Graham, Paul Johnson, William Lind and others) agree that Islam is the reason (too little and too much, respectively). "Certainly the Quranic model of leadership is authoritarian ... but the Bible has its authoritarian tendencies as well" (123). And "Islamic rule was no more autocratic than Chinese, Japanese, or Russian versions" (124). Contra the charge of authoritarianism, Islam, like Christianity, says obey leaders only as far as their commands are in keeping with God's law. And all religions are vague, says Zakaria, therefore 1) easy to follow (use your own interpretation) but 2) easy to slip up (there's always some injunction you're violating). And, like Protestantism, "Islam has no religious establishment" (124) so any individual ("with just a little training" 125) can become a "leader" and claim the true path (i.e. individual conscience). Also, why did Islamism "take off only after the 1979 Iranian revolution?" (125). No, he says after giving more evidence (before Israel's recreation in 1948, Jews were treated well under Muslim rule; regardless of seemingly fundamentalist texts [like Christianity], most Muslims are not anti-Western, anti-modern, anti-capitalist, anti-democracy, anti-feminist), "the real problem lies not in the Muslim world but in the Middle East" (i.e. the Arab world, 127). Zakaria is wrong here (in a left-liberal way); the key to freedom is Christ.
Many have commented on the "Arab Mind" as "veering naturally toward dictatorship," violent, romantic, easily swayed ("the unpledged allegiance of their minds made them obedient servants ... Their mind was strange and dark, full of depressions and exaltations, lacking in rule, but with more of ardour and more fertile in belief than any other in the world" T. E. Lawrence, 128), or even deceitful (lacking accuracy [i.e. lying] or symmetry, slipshod reason, said Evelyn Baring, comparing Oriental and Occidental minds). Of course, they included other "orientals" like Chinese, Japanese and Indians. Also, Western history includes lots of patriarchy, strongmen, romanticism. "Arab politics is not culturally unique; it is just stuck in a time warp" (131). "In the 1940s and 1950s there was much hope in the Arab world that it would recapture its past glory ... they looked up to the United States ... with [its] separation of church and state ... [but] something happened between then and now. In order to understand ... this downward spiral, we need to plumb not the last 400 years of history but the last 40" (132).
The next sections are labelled "The Failure of Politics", "The Failure of Economics", "Fear of Westernization" and "The Rise of Religion." This gives a clue where we're heading. In the 1950s, Egypt's Nasser (having seen the rise of the West, the Chinese, Indians and Ottomans were trying to adapt in order to catch up) embraced the modern, Western (and leftist) ideas of self-determination, socialism, and Arab unity (like Italian fascism, German Nazism). "After WWI, a new liberal age fickered briefly in the Arab world, as ideas about opening politics and society gained currency in places like Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. But the liberal critics of kings and aristocrats were swept away along with those old regimes. A more modern, coarser ideology of military republicanism, state socialism, and Arab nationalism came into vogue ... [but] socialism produced bureaucracy and stagnation ... the republics calcified into dictatorships" (134). In short, the Arabs bought into a set of Western ideas alright, but into the wrong set! (i.e. the losing ones in WWII). Its only gotten worse with time, as governments apply new technology to "squash dissent and strangle civil society" (134). This was the failure of politics.
Next is the failure of economics. The roots of terror have not been poverty or inequality, but resource-based wealth! "Easy money means little economic or political modernization" (138). This not only allows the government to avoid responsiveness and representation, but to pursue repression. "Importing Western goods is easy; importing the inner stuffing of modern society - a free market, political parties, accountability, the rule of law - is difficult and even dangerous for the ruling elites" (139).
Next, the fear of Westernization. 1) Arabs are proud to be heirs to one of the great civilizations of the world and don't want to just copy the West (e.g. like the Asian tigers did) 2) the Western ideas they've tried - socialism, secularism, nationalism - have failed 3) they see the contradictions of modern life, wealth and independence vs. tradition and certainty 4) the Arab world is in the midst of a youth bulge (bad news for any society ... "almost all crime in every society is committed by men between the ages of 15 and 25" (140). France had one just prior to the French Revolution, Iran just before its 1979 revolution, the USA in the late 1960s). "In the Arab world, this upheaval has taken the form of a religious resurgence" (141).
The rise of [fundamentalist Islamic] religion takes its inspiration from the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, who wrote Signposts on the Road in prison in the early 1950s. After helping Nasser rise to power, the Muslim Brotherhood realized Nasser was uninterested in mixing religion with politics. Qutb was inspired by Pakistani scholar (and contemporary) Abul Ala Maududi (and in sympathy with the 17th century "puritanical" Saudi cleric al Wahhab). He advocated overthrowing "impious" Muslim regimes. Zakaria notes that Islamic fundamentalism met the people's needs for meaning, purpose and being heard (authorities could not close mosques, but could and did ban/control political parties and media) (not to mention social services), providing a "powerful language of opposition" (142, Fouad Ajami in The Arab Predicament). "This combination of religion and politics has ... [been] combustible. [The religions] ... of the Abrahamic traditions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) stresses moral absolutes. But [liberal] politics is all about compromise" (142). Scholar Sheri Berman has noted the similarity between Islamist groups and fascist or Nazi groups in meeting people's needs. "If there is one great cause of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, it is the total failure of political institutions in the Arab world" (143). [Hmm, could the rise of American religious fundamentalism be related to the "liberal establishment" shutting them out (or at least marginalizing) of political life? I'd guess Zakaria would say yes, but see Amazon reviewer archimedes tritium's review of Karen Armstrong's book The Battle for God on the fallacy of left-liberal attempts to link Islamic and Christian "fundamentalism"].
The 1979 Iranian revolution gave Islamism a huge boost by demonstrating that 'people power' could trump authority and also that an urban, intellectual, abstract, "literal and puritanical" Islam could trump the older rural, customary, illiterate, "village Islam" (143 "adapted to local culture and normal human desires"). Although the truly poor saw Westernization as magical (provided food, medicine, etc.), the [leftist] intellectuals (often writing from London or Paris) used "Islam as a political tool" (144) to bash the West (capitalism, secularism, consumerism), thereby becoming an adjunct of the worldwide antiwestern Left. They claim the right to pronounce who is or is not a "good Muslim" (in defiance of traditional Islamic decentralized theological authority), thereby scaring and silencing their critics. The Saudi variety exports madrasa-brain-washed fanatics and Arab cultural imperialism (particularly bad in Pakistan). Iran and Saudi Arabia have competed to see whose radicalism could be most effectively exported.
Some have argued that an Islamic "Reformation" is needed, but Zakaria says this would be a fix for a problem Islam has never had; because Islam has been decentralized, the state has always dominated the mosque (an exception is Iran, in which Khomeini broke with Islamic tradition and established a Catholic-like religious hierarchy). Wherever Islamic fundamentalism has achieved power (e.g. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran), it has failed and been discredited. Therefore Zakaria recommends that extremists be given more of a voice (not an exclusive one, just a place at the table), which he predicts will change them from [idealized] "distant heroes ... [into mere] local politicians" (149). "The few Arab regimes [Jordan, Morocco] that ... [have] allow[ed] some dissent within the system, are faring better" (149). [Interestingly, this weakness also applies to Protestant fundamentalism, which usually discourages dissent].
The entire emphasis on a transformation of Islam is misplaced. The key to making Christianity compatible with modernity was not to get the church to suddenly accept liberal interpretations of theology [although some have believed, advocated and tried this]. It was to modernize society [politically, economically, socially] until the churches had to adapt to the world around them. After all, many of the anti-modern prejudices in Islam exist in Christianity as well [e.g. usury, gambling, diet, fasting, clothing] ... Religion in the Western world is now a source of spiritual inspiration and not a template for day-to-day living. The Bible still condemns ... [these things]; Christian societies just no longer see it as an authority on these matters (or interpret it differently) ... [In places where Muslims have had to adapt to modern societies], the majority of believers - though not all - have found ways to be devout without being obscurantist, and pious without embracing fury. The lesson of the varied paths to modernity ... Protestant, Catholic, Confucian, Latin - is that if you get the politics and economics right, culture will follow [this is Moynahan's essential liberal insight, that institutional change can affect culture, the essential conservative insight is that culture matters more than institutions].
Acknowledging that the US is the dominant power in the Middle East, Zakaria suggests we should clarify our goals there as constitutional liberalism, not (yet, at least) democracy. We should push for less state support of radical Islam (esp. Saudi Arabia) and anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism (esp. Egypt), more openness to dissent, a solution to the Israel/Palestine problem (so Muslims can no longer use it as an excuse and diversion). "Moving toward capitalism, as we have seen, is the surest path to creating a limited, accountable state and a genuine middle class" (152). Instead of romantic ideology, the region needs real material progress; instead of political dreams, practical (business) plans. As Churchill said of the Balkans, the region currently unfortunately "produces more history than it consumes" (153). The current business elite mostly "owes its position to oil or ... [family] connections" feudal vs. capitalist wealth. "If culture matters, this [creation of a genuinely entrepreneurial business class] is one place it would help" (here the author shows his Moynahanian liberal colors, assuming institutions are more important than culture). The author sees some progress, but suggests the key is Egypt, "the intellectual soul of the Arab world" (154). Another possibility is Iraq ("before Saddam ... one of the most advanced, literate, and secular countries of the region ... [could potentially] combine Arab culture with economic dynamism, religious tolerance, liberal politics, and a modern outlook on the world" 154, hmmm). "The frustrations [rage] of ordinary Arabs are not about the clash of civilizations or the rise of McDonald's or the imperial foreign policy of the US. They are a response to living under wretched, repressive regimes with no political voice" (155). Similar rage was present 25 years ago in Chile, Mexico, South Korea, but as those dictatorships liberalized and people's lives improved, anti-US sentiment quieted down. The author recommends a 5-year transition period before elections are held to allow development of "civic instititions, courts, political parties, and the economy" (156). "Economic, civil, and religious liberties (not just democracy) are at the core of human autonomy and dignity" (156, hmmm, only God can impart autonomy and dignity, but states must respect it). "Finally, we need to revive constitutionalism ... as it was understood by its greatest 18th century exponents, such as Montesquieu and Madison, [as] a complicated system of checks and balances designed to prevent the accumulation of power and the abuse of office. This is accomplished not by simply writing up a list of rights but by constructing a system in which government will not violate those rights ... 'ambition must be made to counteract ambition' ... [and also] tam[ing] the passions of the public" (157). Unfortunately, non-democratic institutions are now regarded with suspicion. The "Weimar syndrome" refers to people's distrust of 'mere paperwork' to enforce liberty (i.e. making them more likely to push for democracy), "as if any political system in Germany would have easily weathered military defeat, social revolution, the Great Depression, and hyperinflation" (158). "Genuine democracy is a fragile system that balances ... [many voices/forces] to create ... a majestic clockwork" (Tocqueville, 158).
5) Too Much of a Good Thing (i.e. democracy)
Here, the author turns his attention to America, arguing that democracy has been allowed to grow at the expense of consititutional liberalism. In the 1970s, America was "battered by the humiliation of Vietnam, it was struggling with stagflation, oil crises, race riots, and rising crime" (161). Since then, the economy has boomed and there has been improvement on all these fronts (America now "tower[s] above the world politically, economically, militarily, and culturally" 162), but Americans still sense that something is wrong. The author diagnoses the problem as more (too much) democracy, but less (not enough) liberty. Symptoms are declining trust in government, voter (and other civic: party membership, school council, ...) participation (Robert Putnam estimates a 40% decline since the mid-1960s) and status of institutions (e.g. family, church, corporations). As explanations, "some blame it on Vietnam and Watergate, others on government's ever-expanding appetite, still others on the decline in the quality of politicians" (164). But the decline began before Vietnam or Watergate, government as a percentage of GDP has stayed roughly constant for decades and most agree with Ross Perot that Washington is "good people, bad system." "Since the 1960s most aspects of American politics - political parties, legislatures, administrative agencies, and even courts - have opened themselves up to greater public contact and influence in a conscious effort to become more democratic in structure and spirit. And curiously ... this change seems to coincide with the decline in standing of these very institutions" (166).
As a result, organized "special interests" now run Washington. "The more open a system becomes, the more easily it can be penetrated by money, lobbyists, and fanatics" (166). Far from ignoring the electorate, politicians increasingly pander to their every (organized) whim, and ironically the voters have been "repulsed" by this. Jonathan Rauch (Demosclerosis) and economist Mancur Olson have shown how the rise of special interest lobbying has made American government (Rauch's words) "a giant frozen mass of ossified programs trapped in a perpetual cash crunch" (174, Mohair subsidy a notorious example). "When government seems unable to apply any kind of reason or logic to its priorities and spending, people lose faith in its ability to solve new problems" (177). "American government ... [is] a sprawling, largely self-organizing structure that is 10-20% under the control of the politicians and voters and 80-90% under the control of the countless thousands of client groups" (177, Rauch). This is the heart of America's dilemma today" (177, Zakaria). The basic economic driver is that special interests have much more to gain per capita than the general voter has to lose per capita, so only the former organizes.
On political parties, Zakaria notes they were effectively killed by primaries, the latter a Progressive era device to counter corrupt "party machines" (182). The Progessives also introduced "direct democracy" (referenda, initiative, recall) to counter "robber baron" crony capitalism, based on faith in the ordinary public-spirited "Man of Good Will" (187-8). In discussing California's unique situation ("the fullest manifestation of direct democracy in the world today (191) ... a political system that is as close to anarchy as any civilized society has seen" (193), Zakaria states the principle "lack of power and responsibility produces a lack of respect" (195). "Having thoroughly emasculated their elected leaders, Californians are shocked that they do so little about the state's problems" (195). "Politics did not work well when kings ruled by fiat and it does not work well when the people do the same" (196). Ironically, though direct democracy was promoted as a way to limit "big business" influence in politics, the reality is that "only the wealthiest of individuals and interest groups get to play" (196) in this arena. And unfortunately, the new elites have fewer checks on them.
6) The Death of Authority
[title is reminiscent of Robert Nisbet's book The Twilight of Authority. Did Zakaria borrow from this book?]
"The task of this chapter ... [is] explaining how democratization has transformed American society well beyond merely the political sphere" (200). "The democratic wave has moved more broadly across American society - through business [a good starting point, he says], law, medicine, culture, and even, as we shall see, religion ... it has fueled 2 broad social changes ... first ... opening ... many American industries and professions to outsiders and break[ing] down old structures of power and control ... second ... the eclipse of the class of elites who ran these institutions ... even a broader decline of the idea of elites - though not of the reality ... these 2 changes have been part of a more general ... decline of authority ... [and] empowering [of] individuals" (201). Zakaria uses the 2000 acquisition of J. P. Morgan Bank by Chase Manhattan Bank to illustrate a deep change in American society. Morgan had been clubbish, catering to governments, large corporations and the very rich (J. P. Morgan himself highly valued character, trustworthiness) while Chase had served the low end (e.g. home mortgages, car loans, small accounts) (i.e. "mass vs. class" 200). The former approach waned and the latter won the day. The author advocates "sacrificing some energy and dynamism in favor of other virtues, such as transparency, honesty, equity, and stability ... by resurrect[ing], in some form, the institutions and elites we have spent the last 3 decades tearing down" (202).
Over the last few decades, such innovations as credit cards (BoA), money market accounts, mutual funds (Fidelity), IRAs and 401Ks, discount brokerages, junk bonds (fueling MCI, CNN and many other global giants), and CNBC have democratized capitalism. Equity ownership went from 9% in 1951 to well over 50% by 2000. Junk bonds combined with breaking up financial instruments into small chunks purchasable by anyone led to a massive power shift. Now corporations and governments alike had to adjust from dealing with a few financial power brokers (e.g. the Rothschilds) to dealing with thousands of individual investors and mutual funds (allowing capital to critique policies, I might add).
In religion, influence has been draining away from mainline churches and toward "broad, evangelical groups with mass appeal. More important and less recognized is the fact that as these groups have grown they have adjusted and accommodated themselves to their vast followings ... democratiz[ing] American Protestantism" (205-6). Priests, bishops, etc. have lost standing, while populist "priests" like Billy Graham (those "who can claim to be speaking not so much for religion but for the people" 206) have gained it. Although religion in America has always been anti-authoritarian, it had "remained doctrinally demanding [and intolerant of dissent] until recently" (207). It has lately "become doctrinally pluralistic and highly attentive to the beliefs, desires, and wishes of its people. Fundamentalism, having lost its religious core, has become largely a political phenomenon. The average believer has become all-powerful, shaping the organization, doctrine, and beliefs of the religion. Ironically, these democratic changes are most pronounced in the sect that is often seen as reactionary: the evangelical movement ... [which has] made itself populist and democratic, in clear contradiction of its founding ideals ... to avoid the fate of the mainstream churches" (208).
"The puzzle concerning the rise of evangelical Christianity is how, in an era pervaded by individualism and tolerance, such a strict and traditional religion came to flourish" (209). The conventional answer is that it offers an anchor to an anchorless culture, but Zakaria claims the real answer is evangelical market-drivenness and customer-sensitivity (RJN: "Not to put too fine a point on it, one may assume that Mr. [Billy] Graham knows what does and does not sell" 210). Another significant shift was the replacement of the local priest as a moral guide and overseer to television preachers or impersonal megachurches, in which no one is really holding you accountable (unless you allow them to by interaction with them). Jerry Falwell consciously followed a business-oriented "please the customer" approach (his model was the shopping mall). Christian rock, though often cited as signifying "the rise of religion ... [is actually] a sign of the hollowness of that rise" (211). Many ministries (e.g. 700 Club) "have adopted mainstream America's therapeutic attitude toward human problems. People are praised, comforted, consoled, but never condemned" (211-2). "This was, of course, a total repudiation of the original fundamentalist spirit of men like Bob Jones, Sr., and Oral Roberts" (211). "If faith as therapy was [Pat] Robertson's model, faith as hedonism [amusement as 'fishers of men' bait] was the subliminal message of the Pentacostal evangelists Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker" (212).
Zakaria cites experts (leftist anti-Christians?) such as (U of VA sociologist) James Davison Hunter (American Evangelicalism) and U of CA Susan Friend Harding (The Book of Jerry Falwell) as saying evangelicals have gained popularity by deemphasizing certain aspects of historic faith (e.g. heresy, sin, immorality, paganism, judgment, divine wrath, damnation, hell, moral or religious absolutism, intolerance, fundamentalist restraint, sacrificial logic, obsession with authority, hierarchy, rules). "Since authority could no longer be exercised in traditional ways, the only path to survival and success was adaptation" (213). Originally apolitical, Falwell reacted to leftist religious activism in the 1960s (civil rights, Roe v. Wade) by forming the Moral Majority in 1978, for which he incurred the wrath of other fundamentalists. Zakaria hints that Falwell turned to political conservatism ("abortion, gays, evolution" 214) because religious conservatism ("docrinal purity, hostility toward other sects, condemnation of sins such as adultery, and an ascetic rejection of materialist culture" 214) was no longer selling well, but a better explanation I think would be alarm at cultural degradation. Recently, evangelicals "have been experimenting ... with a new enemy, Islam" (214). The decline in religious authority has brought megachurches, seekers, and New Age spiritualism, "but the key feature of all successful and growing mass Christian sects today is an emphasis on individual choice and democratic structures ... [vs. an orthodox] backlash ... in all religious communities ... account[ing] for about 5% of Americans ... over the last 4 decades America's most conservative social movement, evangelical Christianity, went up against modern democratic culture and found itself utterly transformed ... [part of] the more rapid and widespread decline of all religious authority in American life" (215).
Zakaria turns next to literary authority, in the story of BOMC. Founded in 1926 to bring "the best that has been known and thought" to the newly educated American middle class, this democratizing force tried to do so "by elevating people rather than bringing standards down" (216). By 1960, it foundered as its top-down editorial board was seen as outmoded (in the face of all-out '60s anti-authoritarianism), was sold to Time Inc. which promptly commercialized its selections. Now, "instead of trying to shape popular taste, the BOMC was trying to mirror it" (217). The guiding principle was changed from quality (as defined by elites with authority) to popularity (as defined by the market). [Here's that leftist canard again, that markets lead to poor quality, when more like the opposite is true]. Zakaria makes the same case for art museums, that they are no longer leading, but following the public's tastes. He adds that this approach (like in politics) is more open to big-money influence. Both democratization and marketization (i.e. commercialization) are empowering to individuals, which is why both left and right find them hard to criticize, being "unwilling to admit that, without guidance or reference to authority, people can [and often do] make bad choices" (220).
On a related note, Zakaria notes that the older elites (e.g. publishers, producers, lawyers, doctors, ministers, professors), for their part, saw themselves as having public service (not just private profit-making) duties; the term "professional" used to distinguish this aspect vs. pure businessmen. "One of the distinctive elements of Anglo-American society has been that private elites and associations have always performed public tasks. This is unusual; most countries follow the French-continental model, in which government agencies and bureaucrats are placed in charge of every aspect of economic and social life" (221). Hamilton saw these older professions as crucial neutral arbiters between purely self-interested factions. Unfortunately, they are now mere "shadows of their former selves ... hav[ing] been crushed by a pincer ... [of increased market] competition on one side and the state on the other taking over many of the[ir former] functions" (222). Zakaria discusses law, medicine, accounting ("from watchdogs to lapdogs"), banking, brokerage. Zakaria fears that draconian regulation in the wake of financial scandal will mark a possibly inevitable "shift from the Anglo-American model of informal regulation [using implicit ethics] to the continental one of formal regulation [using explicit laws]" (228). It would be better for the professions to police themselves, but maybe at this point "that would be trying to put Humpty Dumpty together again" (228).
In the final section of this chapter (The Suicide of the Elites), Zakaria discusses the continuing existence and need for such elites ("the small percentage of the country that actually runs most major institutions" ... old based on blood, birth, ethnicity; new on money, brains, celebrity ... e.g. Manhattan Institute targets the 10K most influential, Zakaria later suggests 1M or 0.5% of population [235]), but laments that they are increasingly insecure (and therefore more narrowly focused in range of interest and time horizon). "In sum, they do not think or act like elites, which is unfortunate, because they still are" (228). The original idea behind [elite] nonpartisan policy research institutes (Brookings was first in 1916, followed by NBER 1920, CFR 1921) was to transcend ideology, whereas today elite public involvement is entirely partisan (as the older institutes drifted leftward in the 60s and 70s, conservatives created their own right-leaning "counter-establishment"). "One institution remains to play the role of [unbiased] mediator in American society: the press" (231, unbiased?! He's kidding, right?). Unfortunately, due to the now-familiar pincer of democratization and marketization, journalism has experienced "a race to the bottom" (231) as providers try to "amuse or frighten" [e.g. sex, violence] their audiences into staying with them.
Zakaria approvingly quotes James Fallows in saying "society would be worse off if their [industries like health-care, education, journalism, law] supply and character were determined entirely by the free market" (233, their "value to society is not fully captured by a purely commercial model"). "That does not imply that government regulation must be used to protect these industries. Indeed, for law and journalism historically, the solution has been public-spirited elites. But what to do when there are fewer and fewer such elites?" (233). Zakaria notes "it is easier to be public spirited when your perch ... [is] secure." From the founding until the 1960s, WASPs "occupied the commanding heights of American society" (233). But through a combination of moral enlightenment and capitalist demand for the best and brightest (regardless of ethnicity), the WASPs relinquished control (see also Brooks' BOBOs in Paradise, of which this section is very reminiscent but not cited, hmmm). Now the focus of elites is less on being "good and useful" (i.e. duty, character) and more on being sucessful (achievement). Although there was much hypocrisy in the older elite, at least they honored [often in the breach] high standards. Noting the voluntary sacrifice of their lives by many powerful men aboard the Titanic to make room for women and children (per convention, seems unbelievable today), Zakaria warns that we need to recognize and expect more from elites today, rather than pretending we're all the same and there's no elite. In older times, he concludes, "when leaders of society lived up to their ideals they were honored. When they did not it was a matter of deep disappointment. Today, by contrast, we expect very little of those in positions of power, and they rarely disappoint us" (238) [general principle, better results (if sometimes also disappointments) come from high expectations (think parenting, my parents)].
Personal observation: I wonder if my frustrating experiences with teams and lack of ownership at work were related to this negative type of "democratization" (more like socialization) applied to corporate organization?
Also, it seems like this whole book is about the old saying "those who do as they like usually end up not liking what they've done," writ large! i.e. if politically, you give people just what they want, the result will not be pretty (or successful) for society. Hmmm, interesting. Or, the wide road to hell is paved with good intentions.
Conclusion: The Way Out
"The 20th century was marked by two broad trends: the regulation of capitalism and the deregulation of democracy. Both experiments overreached" (239). The years before WWI turned out to be the high-water mark for laissez faire. Thereafter, state intervention (regulation, bureaucracy) increasingly became the solution to every problem (economic, social, political). "The cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy" (240, John Dewey in 1927). "Most problems faced by most democracies during the 20th century were addressed by broadening the franchise, eliminating indirect elections, reducing the strength of elite groups, and empowering more and more people in more and more ways" (240). "The regulation of capitalism had gone overboard by the 1970s ... The state has [since] retreated from the commanding heights of the economy" (240). However, we still await a similar corrective in re-regulating democracy. "It has produced an unwieldy system, unable to govern or command the respect of people" (240), who consistently give higher respect to such undemocratic institutions as the Supreme Court, the armed forces, and the Federal Reserve System. "When the stakes are high [e.g. justice, war, money supply] we do not entrust day-to-day politics to ourselves" (241).
Zakaria notes interestingly that (quoting Joseph Joffe, editor of Germany's Die Zeit: "the EU is the chief, indeed the only, agent of free-market reform on the continent ... without Brussels" there would not have been deregulation, lower deficits, or reductions in wasteful subsidies (243). While its (the EU's) critics in the UK and US are "most often those who fervently support capitalism and free trade ... [its] opponents [in Europe] are people of the opposite persuasion" (243).
The basic problem for governments is how to achieve effectiveness while maintaining legitimacy. Most current democratic theorists are radicals favoring pure democracy (except in the universities where they work, which "still run like medieval kingdoms" 245). "The current system - the WTO and its precursor, the GATT - has produced extraordinary results. The expansion of trade has been the single greatest economic achievement of the world over the past 50 years, producing dramatic declines in poverty and disease around the globe" (246). Interesting question; are bodies like WTO, EU, Fed, etc. good or bad on balance? Zakaria praises Madison (and the Federalists) for prescience in recognizing special interests (factions) as the biggest problem in democracies, and relying primarily on delegation to combat it. Corporate governance is essentially delegation, and "whereas in the rest of life delegation and specialization increase, in politics the trend is in the opposite direction" (247).
In 1997, Princeton professor Alan Blinder wrote an influential article in Foreign Affairs magazine giving 3 good reasons Fed decision-making should be (and is) insulated from politics. "First, [its a] technical subject that specialists are better equipped to handle than amateurs. Second, [it] takes a long time to work and so requires patience and a steady hand. Finally, [there is short-term pain before long-term gain] ... [but] a nasty little thought kept creeping through my head ... [these same reasons apply] to many other areas of government ... [e.g. healthcare, environment, tax policy, or any cabinet-level function]" (248). "The tax code has become [the monstrosity it is] for a simple reason: democratic politics" (249). Blinder proposes an independent, Fed-like tax authority (the same could be done for healthcare, environment, etc., Congress provides broad direction and guidelines, then vote yes/no on resulting bills with no amendments, similar idea used for trade negotiations and military base closings). Zakaria compares this to Ulysses ordering himself bound while passing the Sirens.
In developing countries, the stakes are even higher as world markets can make or break local economies. "Farsighted policies pay huge dividends; short-term patronage politics have immense costs" (251). On a personal note, Zakaria says India has suffered ("on almost every measure of human development: life expectancy, infant mortality, health, literacy, education" 251) due to its politicians' unwillingness to tolerate any short-term pain to their constituents. The solution is not to scuttle democracy, but to increase delegation. "Although it [democracy] does not achieve the best results, it usually protects against the worst" (252). You don't want to completely remove politics from these areas, but merely dampen, weaken, create ballast against its intense short-term pressure.
Delegation is not just a political issue. "Loosening controls, bypassing mediators, and breaking down old standards" are cultural trends. "Technology has combined with ideology to offer the alluring prospect of a world without mediation. You can become your own stockbroker, newspaper editor, lawyer, and doctor. But do you want to?" (253). More importantly, will it improve objective results? Zakaria concludes with a warning. Unless present trends toward democratization are checked, tyranny and/or chaos lies ahead (e.g. ancient Greek and interwar European democracies).
Afterword: The 51st State
While browsing in BN yesterday (23 May 2004), I noticed a new paperback edition of this book that includes a new chapter applying the book's ideas to the US occupation of Iraq (begun March 2003 and continuing today, handover of sovereignty to Iraqis due 30 Jun 2004). He began it by discussing his favorite quote from a newly liberated Afghani (Iraqi?): "I love America, they bring democracy, whiskey, sexy." He repeated that being a big oil state will probably be bad for Iraq and that they should consider operating the industry from a Trust structure, enforcing that benefits be distributed to the people, not squandered by politicians (and stunting political development). He also suggested more international involvement, as he has repeatedly in his Newsweek columns. He emphasized that development of civil society will take a long time and that the USA must stay involved in order for that to happen. When I get ahold of the book I'll do a fuller summary and review of the chapter.
Earlier in his book, Zakaria notes that "By the early 19th century in the UK and the US, for the most part, individual liberty flourished and equality under law ruled. But neither country was a democracy. Before the Reform Act of 1832, 1.8% of the adult population of the UK was eligible to vote. After the law that rose to 2.7%. After further widening the franchise in 1867, 6.4% could vote, and after 1884, 12.1%. Only in 1930, once women were fully enfranchised, did the UK meet today's standard for being democratic: universal adult suffrage. ... The US was [similar] ... In 1824 ... 5% of adult Americans cast a ballot in the presidential election. That number rose dramatically as the Jacksonian revolution spread and property qualifications were mostly eliminated. But not until the eve of the Civil War could it even be said that every white man in the US had the right to vote. Blacks were enfranchised in theory in 1870, but in fact not until a century later in the South. Women got the vote in 1920" (50-1).
Three interesting questions: 1) Has wider democracy been the downfall of once-great Britain and increasingly the US? 2) Is this a better way to explain that downfall (vs. reversion to paganism and rejection of Christianity as I concluded in sdle rvw, although the 2 are no doubt related)? Is this liberalism vs. communism/religion/nationalism just a reprise of M. Stanton Evans "Liberal History Lesson," pitting benighted religion against 'enlighted' liberalism?
Is it possible that Zakaria's call for less democracy is motivated by left-liberal fear of a recently emergent "religious right"? Hmmm, he does also call for deregulating capitalism (while re-regulating democracy).
Some additional thoughts on the tension between raw appeals to tribe, race, religion, class, etc. and liberal constitutionalism, David Pryce-Jones (NR,8 Dec 2003, p. 18) discusses Britain's experience trying to liberalize Iraq from 1917-1920. As the British Civil Commissioner, Sir Arnold Wilson, discussed in his memoirs of that time (ironically titled Loyalties), "the whole secret was to devise some larger loyalty for these warring identities that would allow them to compromise ... [but] the old relgious and ethnic loyalties were completely impervious." London eventually decided to get out (by using subterfuge to create the appearance of an "independent" Iraq, an attempt to cover the continuing stubborn reality of Sunni domination of [majority] Shia and Kurd by force; Pryce-Jones fears America may be about to make the same mistake). This is where Christianity can play a key role; uniting people with other conflicting loyalties. Islam apparently does not have this ability or at least not to the same degree. Arnold noted that his soldiers "stood in lonely places not only for their country, but for the ideals of justice which, as the world will someday come to realize, transcend those of nationality." Left-liberals are trying to create this unifying glue without the key ingredient, Christian faith.
In George Marsden's The Soul of the American University, he cites liberal John Dewey as withdrawing his faith in God (and traditional Christian belief) and placing it instead in science and democracy (interestingly mirroring the same shift in the universities), which he believed was the only path to reliable truth (he believed "Democracy is [always leads to] freedom" 175 and science is [always leads to] truth). He delivered "a stirring appeal to turn away from supposed revelation in 'the older formulation, inherited from days when the organization of society was not democratic [and therefore suspect],' to the scientific method of the university" (176). He justified this by claiming democracy is the expression of God's spirit. He could not accept that democracy could ever lead to tyranny or that science could lead to falsehood (with evil or errored preconceptions or intent). History shows otherwise.
One Amazon reviewer characterized this book as a great example of "geopolitical punditry," in a league with Noreen Hertz' The Silent Takeover, Daniel Yergin's Commanding Heights and Thomas Friedman's Longitudes and Attitudes. He suggested looking at "one of his [Zakaria's] best" Newsweek articles at www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/101501_why.html.
Adam Garfinkle reviewed this book in NR (2 Jun 2003, p. 39), seeing it in very positive terms. Some will "accuse [Zakaria] of being an antidemocratic elitist, and that will be unfair. But he will stand thus accused because, whether he knows it or not, he has written a deeply conservative book in the best, Burkean sense of the word."
Hmmm, interesting about the "whether he knows it or not" since we would assume Zakaria would tend leftward, since he works for Newsweek magazine. Also, he displays the leftist tendency to mistrust religion, seeing it as a primary enemy of "constitutional liberalism." He is flatly opposed to American exceptionalism, insisting liberalism can work anywhere. I suspect he would attribute America's (and the West's) greatness to "accidentally" correct policy, and emphatically not to the Christian faith, Judeo-Christian tradition or any such thing. He does clearly distinguish classical vs. modern liberalism. But he does seem to be a modern liberal in the sense of assuming we humans can fix everything (using reason, don't need God) and that mankind is basically good, just misguided.
The author is obviously in favor of secularization (he links it to advances in democracy, liberalism, progress), but I'm not sure he appreciates the distinction between secularism in government (necessary, healthy if accompanied by minimalism) and secularism in culture (fatal). I surveyed some of Zakaria's recent Newsweek articles, and he's big on internationalizing (NATO) the Iraqi reconstruction and also favors firing General Boyken, who spoke openly of America's Christian God being stronger than Islam's false idol.
In response to Zakaria's diagnosis for American angst in the midst of good news as being due to too much democracy, not enough liberty, I'd say its because we sense (in agreement with the founders) that religious faith and morality are the basis of our freedoms and that these are (and have been for quite awhile) eroding. This may be more a clarification than a disagreement, though.
In his review of this book, William Ruger (First Things, Nov 2003, p. 63) praises Zakaria for making "a bold statement of dissent from th[e] nearly universal democratic faith in the name of republican or 'mixed' government." He criticizes Zakaria's "seemingly simple faith in the rule of elites" and "excessive emphasis on institutional structure in government" vs. necessary cultural changes [in view of Pat Moynahan's dictum that "the key conservative insight is that culture matters more than politics, the key liberal insight is that politics can change culture," Zakaria would here seem more a liberal].
In another review of this book, George C. Leef (book review editor of FFF's Ideas on Liberty magazine), praises many points made by Zakaria, especially democracy's potentially corrosive effect on liberty, but believes in the end Zakaria misses the point. "The problem is not that Americans make too many political decisions democratically, but that they make too many political decisions" and "the move toward democracy is merely a symptom of a deeper problem, growing statism." The more government takes over, the more people demand to have their say. Many decisions are already being made undemocratically, by unelected bureaucrats in the alphabet soup of agencies. Interesting. i.e. don't just change how decisions are made, reduce the size and scope of government.
More in FT (The Public Square, March 2004, p. 55) on "domesticated religion." Zakaria feels "over the last 4 decades America's most conservative social movement, evangelical Christianity, went up against modern democratic culture and found itself utterly transformed ... [part of] the more rapid and widespread decline of all religious authority in American life" (215) and he is happy about this, i.e. that religion has been defanged and domesticated (another evidence he's more a modern than a classical liberal). In the same vein, RJN cites David Brooks, Alan Wolfe (The Transformation of American Religion), Harold Bloom (The American Religion) and Will Herberg (Protestant, Catholic, Jew, 1955, "the classic reference in this connection") as being in this camp (RJN notes the irony in all these cases of "Jews publicly certifying that Christianity is ... safe for democracy ... Jewish thinkers offering revisionist accounts of a 'Christian America' that many American Jews view as threatening"). While they contend the reason American Christianity is no threat to Jews is because its not very Christian, RJN counters that its due to a more authentic and full Christian realization of its bond with living Judaism. He notes its neither correct nor prudent for Jews to say, in effect, 'you're not real Christians, since if you were, you wouldn't be so friendly to us!' (who supports Israeli security, conservative or liberal Christians. "fluid" [defanged] Christianity, like "fluid" liberalism, have abandoned Israel). Brooks wants to say the SBC is in the mainstream, since this will nudge the mainstream rightward. Zakaria also seems to share this view of religion, especially evangelical religion (the branch most feared by leftists as "the religious right").
In a recent Zakaria Newsweek column (A Vision, and Little Else, 13 Sep 2004 issue), in the last few weeks of the intense presidential election season, he praises Bush's lofty foreign policy goals (and reminds Dems that they too should support these goals, as 20C presidents Wilson, FDR, JFK and even Carter and Clinton did, i.e. that American can do alot of good in the world), but claims Bush's actual policies are not getting us closer to those goals. As examples, he cites Bush's ceding much of Afghanistan to warlords and drug dealers and smashing the old Iraqi regime without adequately replacing it. He further accuses Bush of stubbornly insisting that there was no insurgency ("just a few dead-enders"), no more troops were needed, that the American-arranged Iraqi Gov. Council had the widespread support of Iraqis, and that disbanding the Iraqi Army was wise. Bush just couldn't accept inconvenient facts, Zakaria says. He quotes "conservative" (gay, formerly of New Republic) Andrew Sullivan on Bush: "empirical evidence doesn't matter for him ... like all religious visionaries, he simply asserts that his own faith will conquer reality. It won't" (there's Zakaria's typically liberal mistrust of religious faith again). He concludes his piece by noting the GOP's dilemma; they want to spread liberty (grand vision) to people whom they don't really like (i.e. constantly bashing internationalist entities like France, UN). I guess his idea is the standard liberal one that we need to compromise more, to "go along to get along" in the world, to negotiate with, appease, politicize ("Western man demonstrates his cultural sensitivity by preemptively surrendering" Steyn), and generally relax our moral principles in the interest of cooperation. Instead of "war on terror," "axis of evil," they want to sit down and talk it through to thrash out areas of difference. As Mark Steyn says (NR, 13 Sep 2004, p. 68), instead of stoning adultresses to death, beheading sodomites, and killing all Jews, as many imams want, we could work out a compromise whereby "we lightly pebble-dash adultresses, merely castrate sodomites, and kill only some of the Jews, just the troublemakers, maybe 10 percent." This hilariously mocks compromising with evil, which is exactly what liberals always want to do. Steyn quotes a Hezbollah leader: "We are not fighting so that you will offer us something. We are fighting to eliminate you."
In a "Briefly Noted" review of John Lukacs' Democracy and Populism: Fear and Hatred, RJN says: "Over 40 yrs ago, Father John Courtney Murray wrote, 'Perhaps one day the noble many-storeyed mansion of democracy will be dismantled, leveled to the dimensions of a flat majoritarianism, which is no mansion but a barn, perhaps even a tool-shed in which the weapons of tyranny may be forged.' Historian John Lukacs thinks the dismantling has been underway for a long time and looks for no help from a 'conservatism' [i.e. Bush 43] that is, in his view, nothing more than a vulgar mix of nationalism, populism, and militarism ... [but hopes] the RCC [could be] the last, embattled and tattered but, still, here and there visible, bastion and inspiration of personal integrity, decency, and, yes, of liberty and hope'" (FT Oct 2005 p66).
In his Newsweek column (recent issue, read 28 Mar 2006) entitled "Bad?, Not Hopeless," Zakaria says he criticized Bush from the beginning for serious errors in Iraq (e.g. too few troops, destroyed governing institutions including army and beaurocracy [Paul Bremer dismissed army, tho NR claims both army and hierarchy 'collapsed' on their own after the initial invasion, i.e. melted back into civilian population], he has never been able to join the anti-war crowd. He still holds out hope, citing the better example in Afghanistan, where the US [uneasily] recognized the existing power structure [i.e. the warlords] and NATO and EU were given a bigger role just after fall of Taliban [and therefore they took a more active and significant role]. By contrast, the US retained control of Iraq and it became 'a playground for testing various ideologies' within the Bush administration, w/lots of in-fighting (e.g. State v. Defense, etc.). He thinks Iraq can still be rescued, but would like to see the US give more of a role to others (UN, NATO, EU, ...). Also, the main lesson is (as in his book) DON'T destroy existing power structures (i.e. governing institutions), but work WITH them to GRADUALLY [a problem for notoriously impatient Americans] reestablish a more just order.