A continuing special interest of mine has been how our Christian faith is related to liberty, especially the American tradition of limited government and free-market economics. I feel that many (most?) of my fellow Christians have an insufficient appreciation not only of the Christian roots of freedom, but of the secular/atheistic roots of socialism, including American welfare-statism.
In support of this libertarian Christian vision, I set out to write a pair of essays, one to libertarians explaining their (often denied or resisted) dependence on the Judeo-Christian tradition and the other to fellow Christians explaining why they need to be more sympathetic to libertarian ideas. It is appropriate that this the second of these essays is in the form of a summary and review of this book by Rev. Edmund Opitz, a retired Congregational minister who has been a spokesman for libertarian Christians for more than 50 years.
The writings in this book were compiled by its editor (Charles Hallberg) from three earlier books by Rev. Opitz: The Powers That Be (1956), The Kingdom Without God (1956) and Religion: Foundation of a Free Society (1996). Rev. Opitz is a former Congregational parish minister and has been a spokesman for libertarian Christians since 1951, primarily associated with the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE), founded by Leonard Read. He "has long been, and remains, one of the most articulate and deeply thoughtful defenders of a free society" (Donald J. Boudreaux of FEE). In the words of Jeffrey O. Nelson of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI), Opitz is passionately committed "to the principle that human dignity is best advanced within a social framework of freedom." Other high praise comes from M. Stanton Evans: "No one has done more than Edmund Opitz to show that our political-economic freedoms are not simply compatible with, but thoroughly dependent on, our faith." Opitz represents the best of the Puritan/Congregational spirit of a clear thinking, rational and intellectual approach to the ways theology should speak to our culture.
In his excellent Foreword, publisher Charles Hallberg refutes the notion that libertarianism is incompatible with Christianity, claiming boldly that the term "libertarian Christian ... exemplifies nothing less than the true meaning of the teachings of Jesus" (9). Although America's founding was based in the Christian-inspired ideas of individualism and libertarianism and a Christian-inspired disdain of collectivism, it has had to continuously battle at home and abroad collectivism in all its forms (i.e. socialism, fascism, nazism, communism and even increasingly democracy). Collectivism always and everywhere derives its support from what Albert Jay Nock termed "Epstean's Law," that "Man tends always to satisfy his needs and desires with the least possible exertion." He is quick to admit the good side of this law of human behavior (i.e. the invention of the entire gamut of labor-saving devices) but it is easy to see why man tends toward collectivism in the political realm. Hallberg states "the one and only thing that held this temptation in check during the early years of our nation was the religious convictions of the majority of the people, as reflected in the Constitution ... In the mid-1800's a tidal wave of European collectivist philosophy and theology swept across the Atlantic which, by the late 1800's, became known as the 'Social Gospel' under whose spell our individualist theology became branded as "selfish," "greedy" and surely, un-Christian" (10).
The Rev. Irving E. Howard uses his Preface to further explicate the invasion of the Social Gospel onto the American scene. Its 2 fundamental doctrines were the inevitability of progress and the essential goodness of man. The movement was characterized by "a shift in faith from God to man, from eternity to time, from the individual to the group, individual conversion to social coercion, and from the church to the state. The main inspiration of the new movement was non-Christian, and from the beginning it drifted readily into doctrines increasingly removed from biblical faith" (11). As collective man and his society became the new god and the new Jerusalem, a bewildering array of reform movements and experiments in communal living emerged (all of which, like the early Puritan attempt, ended in failure due to human sinfulness). Important contributors to this new way of thinking were Jacksonian Democracy and utilitarianism.
Although early "reformers" continued to affirm the "dignity of the individual in a moral universe" (12), the inherent anti-individualism of the movement was already beginning to emerge. Religiously, it tended to shift the focus from conversion of individuals (who would then redeem society) to reform of society (which would then mold individuals), subtly supporting the idea that society, not each individual, is responsible for human behavior. They promoted the Darwin-inspired idea that God was evolving, by slow process, His Kingdom on earth and that remolding society by government action was part of this evolution.
Christian Socialists like Richard T. Ely and William Dwight Porter Bliss began to attack individualism and the capitalist idea of "competitive strife for profits" as being antithetical to Christianity. They believed, with the later Paul Tillich, that "socialism is the practice of which the New Testament is the theory." Interestingly, while they attacked the greed of private individuals under capitalism, they held to "a naive confidence that politicians would be more altruistic" (16).
Howard notes the large impact of German thinking, which scholars brought back to America after the Civil War, invigorating all aspects of American intellectual life. "In economics, they challenged Adam Smith's laissez-faire. In philosophy, they were proponents of German Idealism. In theology, they introduced the German historical study of the Bible" (15) (i.e. the higher criticism [cf. Julius Wellhausen in 7mrwg]). All of these contributed to the swing toward collectivism, the latter by weakening the authority of the Bible, in which the individualism of orthodox Christianity [and thus Western Civilization] had been rooted.
The early American tradition of the contract theory of government derived from the Covenant Theology (and later expressed in a more secular way by John Locke) which based the legitimacy of government on the consent of the governed. In opposition to this tradition, the Social Gospelers introduced the idea of the "social organism," based in Kantian Idealism and which tended to idealize the state as an entity "separate and distinct from the people who compose it" (17) and minimize the importance of mere individuals.
The most alarming aspect of the Social Gospel movement was its willingness, even eagerness, to "use political coercion to achieve what was thought to be the will of God" (17). Although not novel in Christian history, it did (largely succesfully for a time) coopt the Separatist-Pietist tradition which had dominated American Protestantism and had until that time preferred moral persuasion to legal coercion.
Another driving force of the Social Gospel movement was the increasingly widespread faltering of faith in God and the eternal moral order. Whereas the Separatist-Pietist instinct had bet its life on these axioms, modern "enlightened" Protestants "no longer assumed that a moral order was written into the nature of things" (18). With the invasion of pragmatism, some even "bluntly denied the existence of moral absolutes." This led them to contextualize the Ten Commandments, in particular discarding "Thou shall not steal" in favor of an explicitly marxist call for state ownership of the means of production and destruction of the incentives, habits, legal forms and moral ideals associated with capitalism.
Official denominational support for these ideas included the Presbyterian Department of Church and Labor (the first such organization, part of their Board of Home Missions), the National Council of Congregational Churches Labor Committee (1901), the Methodist Episcopal Church (North) Federation for Social Service (1907), the 33-denomination Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America (1907) and the American Baptist Department of Social Service and Brotherhood (1913). Significantly, when the "roaring 20s" prosperity made it harder to sell class conflict, the social gospelers "shifted their emphasis to international and interracial problems" (19). President Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations was described by the Federal Council of Churches as "an international manifestation of the Kingdom of God."
The Depression years witnessed the resurgence of the Social Gospel message of "sanctified covetousness." A 1934 survey of a large number of clergymen showed an overwhelming bias against capitalism. Rev. Howard closes his Preface by summing up the movement as follows: "The Social Gospel as it developed in American Protestantism was not an application of the teachings of Jesus. It has been challenged to produce its intellectual and ethical credentials - and it has none" (20). None, we should add, other than the rank paganism which mocks God and makes man the measure of all things, revels in the here and now - the hereafter be damned, glorifies superior force as the rightful owner of unlimited power and sees the individual as a mere tool or cog in the great march to collective hegemony.
Chapter 1 (The Issues: A Debate) is opened with a striking quote from Dean William R. Inge of St. Paul's Cathedral in London: "Powerful Churches have gained the upper hand by methods utterly opposed to the spirit of Christ. As Berdyaev says, men have set themselves to hate in the cause of love, to use compulsion in the name of freedom, and to become practicing materialists for the inculcation of spiritual principles" (22). The body of this chapter is a 1956 debate between Rev. Opitz and a former teacher; Rev. John C. Bennett, then Dean of the faculty and professor of Christian theology and ethics at Union Theological Seminary. Bennett clearly represents the Social Gospel movement of his day.
Responding to a Bennett speech entitled A Christian View of the State, Opitz takes exception to Bennett's view that there is nothing in Christian philosophy that tells us how the power of the state ought to be limited. Bennett therefore sees the proper approach as being "a great deal of experimentation" (26) (i.e. a moral license for social engineering). Opitz notes a school of theology close to this position, which sees the state as "standing under the sovereignty and judgement of God," and "having confidence that the Deity will take care of the ultimate outcome, they feel free to substitute the imperatives of the modern state for principles as a guide to conduct. They engage in 'Realpolitik,' in the experimental, piecemeal approach to social problems" (27). Opitz strongly objects to these ideas, asserting that it is ridiculous to think that Christian judgement would be silent as to limiting an agency capable of taking life itself.
Opitz explains how his exposure to the essays of the philosopher Albert Jay Nock brought him to "the outskirts of a large and impressive body of thought" (24). "The more I got into it," he says, "the less was I able to stomach the prevailing mode of social thought among theologians and intellectuals. Their hankering after a planned economy, or a welfare state, or socialism, or a mixed economy, had little attraction for me. The remedy they urged, it seemed to me, was nothing but an articulate form of the disease: government force against persons to cure the evils caused by prior political intervention" (24) [In 1963, Opitz, Robert Thornton and A. H. Aring founded the Nockian Society to promote continued availability of Nock's writings].
Opitz complains that the typical student in college and seminary is increasingly being fed the one-sided "notion that a genuine concern for his fellows and for the good of society must lead a man to embrace the progressive extension of the functions and controls of government. Resistance to this idea is attributed to selfishness, or habit, or 'the cultural lag,' or to some unlovely general term like 'reaction.' That there is another point of view ... that it has long roots in the past and an impressive literature, and that it has a strong moral and intellectual case" (24) is not presented to the student. This alternative point of view goes by the names classical liberalism and libertarianism and is generally unknown in theological circles and unfashionable among the intelligentsia [the Acton Institute is trying to remedy that, including taking in Opitz' papers at his death].
While agreeing with Bennett on the need for the state to be able to coerce obedience in certain cases, the debate is about the proper limits of the use of such coercion. Practically speaking, there is no need to force men to act in ways they would act without such force, either naturally or through education, persuasion or some other voluntary inducement (e.g. conversion and sanctification). Additionally, Opitz recognizes the potential for excessive coercion to destroy civil society, which is inherently based on voluntary cooperation. The question boils down to this: The business of society is peace; that of government is violence, so what service can violence render to peace? The libertarian answer is that government must confine its activities to restraining peacebreakers [or in Bastiat's words, preventing plunder, see br-tLaw].
Bennett responds with 3 points: 1) The state should indeed be limited to protect civil society, but in a soft, pragmatic, experimental way rather than in a hard, dogmatic, doctrinal way. He believes the state can and should often assume new functions as new situations arise. 2) He disputes the view of the state as essentially coercive and violent, claiming instead that it exists to "serve" civil society (with its consent), with only one of many roles being the "dark and forbidding element" (28). He regrets the need for the state to provide national defense (v. more "constructive" functions), but sees no way to avoid it. 3) He rejects the view of the state as the "chief enemy of freedom," citing its [in his view good and necessary] newly acquired functions in the wake of the depression to protect citizens from the "tyranny of circumstances" and the "tyranny of private centers of economic power." He accuses Opitz and others of creating an opening for "the very movements which you detest" by denying the state its needed respect, authority and appropriate instruments.
Opitz responds to Bennett's 3 points in turn: 1) While acknowledging that Bennett is not an absolutist on state power, he notes Bennett's lack of a priori limits on state power in principle. His experimental approach rejects the old maxim that "what is morally wrong cannot be politically right" (31). Opitz counters that the ONLY valid source of state power comes from rights "severally delegated" to the state for the sole purpose of "defensively to neutralize force." 2) "The true prototype of government is the constable." Anything further than that is "a use of legal force against peaceful citizens" and thus "impairs the moral principle which should guide political action." Intentions are often good, but "helping" some via political action necessarily means hurting others. It comes down to faith, in that "if there are only pragmatic and experimental sanctions for political activity, then I have nothing more to say. But if, as I believe, there are a priori moral principles by which political action is judged, then there is a real issue here" (33). 3) Government aids freedom by securing individual rights. To speak of "blind" market forces presumes they need direction. In fact, markets mean people are making choices, which a planner may only deprive by the use of power, which "ministers to human pride and brings spiritual disaster." All economic injustice stems from political privilege or failure to prevent predation. Bennett recommends fighting totalitarianism by accepting a little of its philosophy. What's needed is not an ineffective government (as Bennett claims libertarians want), but one strong enough to enforce individual rights and uninvolved in all else. The result of merely "pragmatic and experimental" limits will be the throwing of a vast and ever-expanding "network of regulations over economic activities." Excessive state activity stifles innovation and violates individual morality. It all comes down to opposing principles. If we accept the basic assumptions of totalitarianism [i.e. paganism] about the nature of man and society, its conclusions about government will follow. What's needed is a well-thought, assertion of opposing [i.e. Judeo-Christian] principles and a willingness to follow their logic [which is how freedom of all types originated in theory and practice, see ttif, vor, ...]. Of these latter, Edward Gibbon refers to "... those benevolent principles of Christianity, which inculcate the natural freedom of mankind" (the quote that leads off chapter 2).
Bennett responds to clear up a misunderstanding and to cite several major issues dividing the 2 views. "The difficultly," he says, "lies not in the absence of permanent and relevant moral principles, but in the fact that on most concrete issues in life we find there is tension between" the principles, most often between justice/order and freedom. He claims the commandment to love our neighbors overarches all other principles, and complexity arises due to conflicts among the interests of "our neighbors." Although moral principles apply to the state as well as to the individual, "the complexity of the conflict between values and interests" is greater for the state than for the individual. He goes on to cite 3 major issues of disagreement: 1) Opitz' view insufficiently values "community" or "society" in favor of individuals. Coercion of unwilling individuals in support of the common good may have its evil aspect, but that must be balanced with the evil of coercion of circumstances of the less fortunate. 2) Laissez-Faire may have made sense for a simple, individualistic economy with only small enterprises, but not for a modern, complex one with large enterprises. The state MUST intervene to prevent socially disastrous massive inflation, deflation or unemployment. 3) Freedom for whom ... the state must defend the weak against the strong ... the last century has seen the slow correction of the "horrible exploitation and injustice of capitalism" by democratic processes (40). Private charity is not adequate to the task. Children and workers have rights (to opportunities and jobs) similar to the older property right. Your focus on economic freedom for the already strong eclipses "many other values and needs to which the community must do justice," and equal opportunity requires state action. If your dislike of experimentation prevents addressing the sources of social unrest, you will help to destroy freedom.
Opitz responds: I'm disputing your assumptions, which you apparently take for granted without discussion. Then, when we reach different conclusions, you question my good faith. These faulty assumptions are part of our climate of opinion and are undetectable to most. One is that "political action has an almost magical efficacy" (42). I'll be more blunt than I have until now; inflation, deflation, depression and unemployment are all results of political intervention into economic affairs. Further, unsuccessful state intervention added momentum to the trend toward WWII (as an economic stimulus, which it indeed was). You suggest avoiding the dogmas of right and left, but I say objective thinking on these topics should avoid popular jargon and axioms. You have gone beyond analyzing and criticizing our philosophy by also passing moral judgement on those holding it (brooding over ones moral superiority is unhealthy for the soul).
You imply that the "already strong" have become so at the expense of others, but this is only possible with political power. So you propose more such power to right past wrongs done by the same. Basic to your thought is the idea of a vast majority too foolish, weak, gullible to care for themselves, requiring good souls like you and a few others to wield power on their behalf. This is a type of parasitism and our way of thinking will end it. If the goal is to provide better housing, medical care, education and a peaceful society to the "disadvantaged," state economic intervention (i.e. political favors) makes no sense (since it leads to the opposite), however if the goal is to attain power over people, it does make sense.
Although you say you believe in enduring moral principles which apply to both individuals and governments, you seem to have given up on [at least on the latter] actually living by it, citing "tensions" between principles. Do you mean to say that there is really tension and conflict between "the principles by which we must act" or are the tensions actually between the principles and our ignorance and self-will? Your warning against allowing "ideas" to become "absolute or frozen" chillingly reveals your relativism. In that sense, we do "seem to live in two quite different worlds."
You show a confusion between coercion and consent (induced by persuasion or education) and also between offensive and defensive force. In both cases, the former is morally wrong and the latter is morally right. The only desirable kind of equality occurs when no man is allowed to live at the involuntary expense of others. While social order cannot be established by political action, it can certainly be destroyed by it. Your view trends toward the disintegration exhibited by the modern world. In practice, the limits of state power are set by popular consent, unfortunately not always guided by righteousness (i.e. moral correctness).
Monopolies are only possible with political support. Please name one that exists without either state support or negligence.
We do NOT advocate "individual decisions, freed from all interference by the state." Decisions of peacebreakers can and should be interfered with. You argue that modern complexity requires state coordination, but I counter that only spontaneous market mechanisms can handle this level of complexity [a key Hayek point, i.e. the 'fatal conceit' by bureaucrats that they can manage this]. "To speak of man's original freedom which he must sacrifice in society for the sake of order; or ... that 'the individual should dedicate himself to the welfare of the group' is to use words that refer to no discoverable reality" (52).
You say its OK to override the wills of a few people to accomplish the greater good, but this contradicts longstanding moral reasoning ("... it is better that thousands should die in tumults rather than that order should be preserved at the cost of injustice voluntarily done to one innocent man" says Archbishop Temple in Nature, Man and God). Your use of the phrase "coercion of circumstances" and likening of that concept to political coercion confuses "the necessities and imperatives of the human situation with the all-too-human vice of imposing one will on another."
What you deride as "rough and ready methods of determining who gets what" is actually a delicately articulated device called the market, which results from millions of voluntary (uncoerced) choices made by men and women in free society. Reluctance to accept the market's verdict derives from the selfish human tendency to overvalue our own output and undervalue others'.
"Jobs" result when certain individuals allow others to use their property to the benefit of both parties. To advocate that a person allowed to use another's property acquires a "right" to it is to discourage accumulation of property and its efficient use, the basis of prosperity. To claim that the victims of these policies will neither suffer personally nor lose their incentive is to admit ignorance to the large body of evidence to the contrary.
Other thoughts are: 1) The people known as "the poor" would do fine if it weren't for legalized predation. 2) The biggest burden of improper political action falls on those with small to medium incomes. 3) Although you claim the moral high ground, you don't offer to take any voluntary personal steps to these ends, preferring only coercion of others. 4) What you criticize as "libertarian philosophy" bears little resemblence to what I and others understand by that philosophy.
The two agree that further discussion would be fruitful, although Bennett feels their different premises are causing them to think and talk past one another.
In chapter 2 (Roots Of American Liberty), Rev. Opitz reminds us of the meaning and value of the first amendment clause disallowing establishment of any "state" religion in America. This forced the keepers of the various theologies, doctrines and creeds to compete in the marketplace of ideas, using religious means only; reason, persuasion and example. This is a good thing for both sides, avoiding the "twin evils of a politicized religion and a divinized politics" (60). However, in recent years many social gospelers and "progressives" have ignored this important principle, attempting both to use politics to advance their religious views and also to graft their (socialist) political agenda onto a religious basis. They have promoted, in effect, "the Socialist Party platform in ecclesiastical drag" (59).
America is a Christian Nation in the sense that "our understanding of human nature and destiny, the purpose of individual life, our convictions about right and wrong, our norms, emerged" from Christendom and not from Buddhism, primitive animism or some other religion [e.g. paganism, as in classical times]. Not, however, in the sense that Iran is a Shiite nation, for example. The genius of America was to have a religious society with a secular political order. The idea was that man's spiritual life is much too important to be entrusted to the state, which should merely protect the equal rights to life, liberty and property of all citizens. This ingenious separation was never meant to suggest that religion and politics are incompatible [the idea behind an impenetrable 'wall of separation']. Indeed, there can be "no coherent political philosophy apart from a foundation of religious axioms and premises" (62).
Just as Christianity underlies the American founding and the ideals of religious freedom, limited government and free-market economics [i.e. religious, political, economic, ... freedom], the religion of dialectical materialism underlies Marxist political theory and totalitarian practice. Even Tom Paine, trenchant critic of organized religion, admitted that "political as well as spiritual freedom is the gift of God through Christ" (63). Similarly, Edward Gibbon, "so critical of the [Roman Catholic] Church in his history of Rome, nevertheless pays tribute to '... those benevolent principles of Christianity, which inculcate the natural freedom of mankind' (63). "Our forebears ... regarded human freedom as a religious imperative," often quoting Bible verses such as II Cor. 3:17 ['where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty'] and Lev. 25:10 ['you shall proclaim liberty throughout the land to all its inhabitants']. They fought for freedom of all types (e.g. worship, speech/press, private ownership, ...) and popularized the slogan "Life, Liberty and Property!" [latter later modified to the brighter sounding 'pursuit of happiness']. Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations was the economic counterpart to the political ideas of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence (both published in 1776).
The central doctine of the American political system is the inviolability of the individual. This principle leads to individualism and equality before the law (as before God). H. L. Mencken, usually critical of religion, wrote "Of all the ideas associated with the general concept of democratic government, the oldest and perhaps the soundest is that of equality before the law. Its relation to the scheme of Christian ethics is too obvious to need statement. It goes back, through the political and theological theorizing of the middle ages, to the early Christian notion of equality before God ... The debt of democracy to Christianity has always been underestimated ... Long before Rousseau was ever heard of, or Locke or Hobbes, the fundamental principles of democracy were plainly stated in the New Testament, and elaborately expounded by the early fathers, including St. Augustine" (Equality Before the Law, 1926). The quest for freedom as represented in the Judeo-Christian tradition [and Western Civilization] is not a characteristic of man as such, but is religiously inspired.
The order, harmony, beauty, balance, intelligence and economy of the world we observe around us argues for intelligent design, i.e. its explanation is not self-contained. Just as there are discoverable laws of science, there are also moral laws, summarized by the Ten Commandments. Just as individuals must observe certain physical laws to survive (e.g. need for air, food, shelter), societies must observe the moral code. Failure to do so leads to death in both cases.
Even the imperfect observance of the moral code in the Christian west has lead to a level of prosperity unimaginable to previous generations. Ironically, this eventually caused widespread concern about biblical warnings against the false gods of wealth and power. Contrary to the misguided opinions even of some Christians (e.g. Ron Sider), the Bible "legitimizes the normal human desire for a modicum of economic well-being" (68), and furthermore, in fact provides the general recipe for both individual and societal prosperity. The Third World is poor not because of the wealth of the west (as claimed by Sider and others), but because it lacks the (Christian-inspired) institutions of freedom that fostered our own prosperity. Although herculean efforts have been made to bring this message to the third world in hopes of brightening its prospects, in most cases their non-Christian foundations have hindered its acceptance. Exceptions to this sad rule would be Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore.
Social Gospelers and progressives have always been fond of advocating "a preferential option for the poor and oppressed." But "preference" implies redistribution via tax and subsidy, enriching some at the expense of others and leaving the nation poorer. Anyone truly interested in helping the "poor and oppressed" (v. enhancing their own power) will recognize that "the free-market economy, wherever it has been allowed to function, has elevated more poor people further out of poverty faster than any other system" (70) and that oppression is always political, in the form of unjust laws. The solution is to remove these unjust laws and return to political and economic liberty. Examples of modern-day oppression include minimum wage laws, monopoly-granting union laws, welfare-state transfer programs and forced foreign aid to oppressive regimes abroad.
How about certain Bible passages which seem to condemn riches, like Luke 18:25 and Matt. 19:24 "It is easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God" and Luke 6:20 and Matt. 5:3 "Blessed are the poor [in spirit]"? Rev. Opitz argues that the best way to understand these passages are as condemnations of the unfairly rich (e.g. the "publicans," via political plunder, common throughout the Roman Empire and in nearly every other nation known to history) and affirmations of "the poor" as "those who know their need of God" (e.g. often those on the lower socio-economic ranks). In short, Jesus was condemning political plunder and saying that all people (including the lowly) are equally precious in God's sight.
When Paul says "The love of money is the root of all evil" (I Tim. 6:10), the word 'money' symbolizes the secular world's pursuit of wealth and power (i.e. Nietszche's dominating 'will to power'). He is telling us to accept this world with all its joys and delights, live life to the fullest, but remember we are pilgrims, not settlers. Our ultimate destiny is achieved in the hereafter. Similarly, Luke 12:17 ("Soul, you've much goods laid up for many years, take it easy, eat, drink and be merry") warns us not to give up, but keep growing, not to trust in riches, but be rich toward God. This is not a condemnation of riches as such, but a warning to be good stewards of our resources, being mindful that our life here is a test or school for life eternal.
In chapter 3 (Ethics and The Welfare State), Rev. Opitz further discusses the relation of Jesus' teachings to social organization. Although many churchmen have advocated either full-blown Socialism or some "middle course between the extremes of Capitalism and Socialism" (e.g. New Deal, Welfare statism), the author shows that anything short of a free society will "necessarily and continously nullify the ethics of Jesus" (77). Jesus summed up his teaching with two great commandments; love God with all of our being and love others as ourselves. The chief impediment to both is human pride, the tendency of each person to place themselves at the center of their system of meaning [Darryl Delhousaye's 'blessed trinity: me, myself and I' :) ]. "Altruism" (term coined by [secular humanist] August Comte) is really disguised egoism, since it heightens self-consciousness instead of fostering true self-transcendence. The order of Jesus' commands suggests that "true neighborliness and genuine community follow the individual's discovery of his real self in relation to God" (79). Lacking an understanding of the aim and purpose of personal life as given in the first commandment, men tend to either dominate others or to adopt a "do-goodism" toward them. This "do-good" attitude yields smugness in the do-gooder and resentment in the do-goodee, rarely yielding the intended benefit. Knowledge of the "infinite worth and dignity" of each individual is "all the warrant one needs for refusing to impose his will on another, and for resisting the imposition of an alien will over his own" (79).
By considering the actual mechanics of a socialist (or welfarist) order, we can see that such an order fails to square with Jesus' two great commandments in at least three ways:
1) some must be hurt before others are "helped"
- altruism is a deadlier egotism
- helping others is properly a by-product of our love/svc to God, not a primary goal
- true righteousness is unselfconscious
- shifts focus of religion from personal transformation to social reform
- conventionalizes [functionalizes] religion into merely a prop to the social order
- some men are deliberately put at the disposal of other men
- Pharisees conventionalized righteousness, which evoked Jesus' bitterest denunciations
2) welfarism involves a continuous violation of personality
- Jesus didn't condemn wealth, but demanded good stewardship
- property, material possessions are good, not inherently evil as in other religions
- corruption comes from spirit (man's renegade will), not material things
- avarice and miserliness are soul-sicknesses
3) political privilege is always wrong and always leads to corruption
- many have mistakenly condemned riches instead of political privilege
- no people has ever resisted political privilege once they started it
- wealth in Jesus' time was mostly from Roman favors, not industry and thrift
Jesus' admonition to the rich young ruler to divest his wealth was specific to him. Jesus' apparently detected a perverse attachment in the man's heart to his wealth. It is true that riches can create temptation and testing, but these can yield virtue as well as vice. The proper attitude toward material things is to master them by practicing a philosophy of non-attachment or "holy indifference" toward them. After all, the less time required for creature needs, the more can be turned to things of the spirit. The cure for materialism is not political barriers to meeting material needs. Jesus recognized that the poor would always be among us and encouraged us to voluntarily give generously to assist them. He regarded the blessing to the giver as being even greater than that to the receiver ("It is more blessed to give than to receive" Acts 20:35). While Paul admonished us to "bear one another's burdens" (Gal. 6:2), he also realized that some may be tempted to relax and allow themselves to be carried along by others, and therefore added "Everyone will have to carry his own load" (Gal. 6:5).
While nothing in biblical injunctions to help our neighbors can properly be "construed as sanctioning the use of political coercion to deprive some men of what is rightfully theirs for the dubious benefit of someone else," the main argument against the welfare state is in the stark difference between its underlying philosophy and Christian ethics. Simply put, the former places some people at the disposal of others, while the latter respects every person simply as a person (87).
The theme of chapter 4 (The Ecumenical Movement and Social Action) is summed up in an introductory quote from Aldous Huxley; "The cult of unity on the political level is only an idolatrous ersatz for the genuine religion of unity on the personal and spiritual levels" (88). Rev. Opitz discusses the origins of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the existence from its beginning of some "dubious baggage," i.e. agendas having nothing to do with the quest for a united Christendom. Like churchmen of all ages, certain participants cherished then currently popular secular dogmas, desiring to lend them extra support by finding a logical place for them in the great Christian scheme, although they had no necessary connection to the faith. He cites as examples a flat earth in the 15th century, the divine right of kings in the 16th, the fact of witches in the 17th and "Social Questions and International Affairs" in the 20th (the names of 2 WCC study themes). By the former of these two was meant "that government should be freed from the shackles placed upon it in the philosophy and practice of historic [classical] Liberalism so that it might play a more active role in regulating economic life and thus bring about a social levelling," and by the latter a single world government "of man-made law whose precepts are to be forced on reluctant people, if that prove necessary, by an international political body" (93).
The author quotes the old saying of Luther's protege Melanchthon; "In necessary things unity, in doubtful things liberty, in all things charity," and suggests that these issues are doubtful at best. He sheds light on the secular faith of the modern world; the belief that once the state accumulates enough power it can impose "social justice" from above and usher in the kingdom of heaven on earth. Interestingly, Rev. Opitz sees battling these doctines on the domestic side as the more urgent, since political interventions there create dislocations which tend to bolster the case for intervention abroad. Pushing this theme still further, he explains how misuse of political power promoted injustice, which paradoxically prompted some well-meaning people (including many Christians) to propose using state power to remedy these ills. Even so, the social gospel movement represented a co-opting of Chrisitianity for secular ends, as evidenced by its basis on social action rather than doctrinal or creedal agreement and by its lack of support from most rank and file church members. Their social action colors were displayed by their consistent warm support of the labor cause and their call to reject both communism and laissez-faire capitalism as extremes in favor of a middle way (Herbert Spencer noted already in the 1870s that the terms 'reactionary' and 'laissez-faire' were used in derogatory reference to any who questioned the divine and effectual authority of the state [100]).
Even so, Rev. Opitz rejects the notion of any sinister aspect on the part of social gospelers (I'd agree on their intentions, but would allow that Satan may well have used them for his own evil purposes), preferring instead to view them simply as capable, well- intentioned people with strong beliefs and seeking to implement those beliefs as best they can. He summarizes his two main points of this chapter: that there is indeed a genuine Christian unity which preceded the ecumenical movement and upon which the latter was based, and that this movement was promoted largely by people with a collectivist social philosophy, a "doubtful thing" (actually a dead wrong thing) which is actually an impediment to true Christian unity. During the social gospel's heyday, there were few libertarians to argue, but many have since noted the unChristian and immoral features of every flavor of collectivism. Unfortunately, most ecumenical churchmen ignore these objections and more generally betray a weak grasp of economic realities (R. H. Tawney is cited for example) (98).
The author notes that the social actionist churchmen have allied themselves with the secular intelligentsia in their views of social reconstruction. The WCC's Amsterdam report on a "responsible society" was "a straight welfare state platform garnished with references to the Deity" (98). This implies both that this agenda is nonChristian (it is actually of pagan origin) and that churchmen were insufficiently critical of these views, hewing instead to an early form of secular "political correctness." Sources of then contemporary outspokenly [dissenting] Christian views which were ignored were Thibon and Mounier in France and Belloc, Chesterton, Gill and Penty in England. In the same way that churchmen had learned to value freedom, tolerate diversity of thought and eschew the use of the state to force unity in the area of religious conviction, they should have taken the same approach to social convictions. This attitude would have then and should now make us loath to impose any particular social agenda upon our fellow man by the use of political means, other than that each person be treated with dignity and respect for his God-given rights. This philosophy of avoiding state "establishment" should be applied not only to religion, but to medicine, housing, education and economics, and for the same reason; these areas of life are too important to allow ham-fisted state control. "A social philosophy ... not broad enough in conception to work toward guarantees of personal liberty no matter what personal belief, is not generous enough to bear the label 'Christian'" (100).
Rev. Opitz shows the "political correctness" of the social activist position by its attacks on its opponents; references to "the anarchy of an individualistic capitalism" and generally putting anyone questioning their version of a "responsible society" in the "awkward position of seeming to endorse a chaotic and irresponsible society." They criticize "unqualified individualism," but that's merely a strawman advocated by no one the author is aware of. They claim to avoid "doctrinaire" defenses of both socialism and capitalism, which is to say they're content with a muddy avoidance of extremes instead of attempting to apply principles and logic to social questions. Instead of encouraging an open discussion of the issues, they prefer to impugn those who would dare to question their dogmas.
Summing up, the author sees their position as intellectually dubious at best, unable to withstand serious and free inquiry (which they therefore suppress) and in any case unrelated to the project of seeking means to express Christian unity. Collectivism is the great secular faith of our time. For religious adherents, it represents a deification of Caesar; for others, a cynical and crafty means for their will to power. Some have been willing to die for this cause, for each willing martyr, there have been hundreds of unwilling victims. It is part of our climate of opinion and many hold unexamined sympathies toward it. The few who would try to excise every trace of it from their thinking are seen as extremists and cranks. The key to enlightenment is recognizing: that each individual stands before God; the difficulty of this task; and the ridiculousness of the idea that we have a mandate from God or society to run another's life against his will. Far from adding strength to the ties that bind men in Christian love, collectivism leads to the war of all against all in the struggle for state-assisted domination over "the other."
In chapter 5 (A Survey On The Social Action Literature), Rev. Opitz observes that most of the writings deeply influential to the Social Gospel, Social Actionist movement were written by men outside the church, or even profoundly hostile to it. The top 3 before WWI were likely [Karl] Marx, [Thorsten] Veblen (the "godfather of the New Deal") and [Werner] Sombart (who became a Nazi in 1933 [suggesting the relatedness of left/right collectivisms]). In addition to these, churchmen were especially influenced by English Fabians like R. H. Tawney, Sidney and Beatrice Webb and G. D. H. Cole. Of these, Tawney especially struck a chord in clerical circles with his book The Acquisitive Society (1921). It offered an "analysis and criticism of a society so overborne by the lust to acquire material things that it has forgotten the ends which made material things worth acquiring" (106). Unfortunately, he mostly ignored the most evil form of this malady; political redistributionism. Although criticizing the privileged, he sought not to abolish it [i.e. privilege] but to redistribute it more widely ... it "works so well for the few that the Fabian wants everyone to have a political advantage over his neighbor!" (107). This failure of the Fabians to notice state intervention as the largest and most obvious source of unfair privilege in society typifies the glaring blind spot in much of modern social thought. Tawney's even more influential book Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (1926) argued that the Protestant Reformation created a climate which allowed capitalism to flourish [following Max Weber]. Unfortunately, it also repeated many economic misconceptions typical of the Fabians, involving a basic failure to appreciate the wonders of capitalism, even attributing to it malign tendencies. [Ludwig von] Mises summarized Tawney's main economic fallacies as the failure to understand that capitalism has:
1) abolished all forms of slavery, serfdom, indentured labor, ...
2) made the wage-earner a consumer, not just a producer (as in pre-capitalist times)
3) promoted workers to customers, 'who are always right'
4) raised the average standard of living in an unprecedented way
5) made the first concern of big business to be mass production for mass consumption
Another front in the great debate is summarized in the maxim "What is morally wrong cannot be politically right" (108). It is telling that this moral principle must be dispensed with (or at least a special moral dispensation granted) if the ruling elite in a planned society is to act as they must, and this is acknowledged by defenders of a more powerful state. William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, argued (in his book Christianity and the State, 1928) that the state must not be subject to the same rules of moral behavior as individuals and went on to promote the idea that (property) rights come from the state and are at its discretion (i.e. it is imperative in a planned economy that property be placed on a purely legal basis, with moral sanctions for it not allowed). This is a clear departure from the older view that inalienable rights (i.e. to life, liberty, property) are granted by God to individuals and must be respected by the state. Max Weber's hugely influential book The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905) made the case that modern capitalism is to some extent a social outworking of Protestantism (especially Calvinism). Weber, more cautious than later writers on the same theme such as Tawney, made the point that capitalism is not the same as unlimited greed for gain. While the latter has existed as long as humans have, the former actually tends to temper that primeval desire in practice. Similarly, Werner Sombart tried to link capitalism to Judaism in his book The Jews and Modern Capitalism (year?). In response to these efforts, Charles A. Beard warned against trumpeting the economic benefits of religion, citing corrupt practices of the medieval Catholic Church (e.g. offering forgiveness for sale ...). Also, Lewis Mumford later added some balance by "relating certain Catholic monastic and medieval practices with modern capitalism" (110). Rev. Opitz recommends these books for great reading but warns that it is an open question whether they go much beyond conjecture [see also Rodney Stark, Robert Royal, Jonathan Hill, Thomas Cahill, Thomas Woods ...].
Along with William Temple and many others, Reinhold Niebuhr argued that different rules apply for individuals and the state, leading to "political policies which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing" (110, i.e. 'realpolitik'). He, like many others, was strongly influenced by Marxism and believed it "will provide the only possible property system compatible with the necessities of a technical age." Many of these commentators (e.g. Jerome Davis' Capitalism and its Culture, 1935) attached the label "capitalism" to all that they perceived was wrong about our society. In the academy, the term "academic freedom" came to bear no relation to either word, being instead a euphemism for suppressing conservative views and forcing schools to hire and promote leftists (an early appearance of "political correctness").
Rev. Opitz next examines the literature of muckraking, or "legalized plunder," which criticized the great 19C American fortunes, claiming they resulted from exploitation by predators who had been careful to secure the sanction of the state. He cites the book History of the Great American Fortunes by (Marxist) Gustavus Myers (1909, republished 1936) and America's 60 Families by Ferdinand Lundberg (1937) (he might have mentioned Matthew Josephson's 1934 The Robber Barons). Although the main purpose of this literature was to demonize these "robber barons" and call for more government controls against them, it is impossible to miss the unintentional but true observation that exploitation always requires state complicity. By carefully exposing the granting of political privilege behind many of these fortunes, they also unintentionally explode another of their own myths; that laissez-faire prevailed in the 18-19C in America. Not all fortunes were made by plunder (many arose by providing goods or services to willing buyers), but those that were relied on the state for their privilege to do so. "The collectivist who starts to analyze exploitation with the idea of passing a government remedy for it, is hoist on his own petard" (114). Although these "apostles of social change" gave lip service to freedom (e.g. "On freedom all spiritual life depends. It is astonishing and terrifying that the church has so often failed to understand this." William Temple, 1942), their prescribed policies were inimical to that goal.
By the 1950s, the older idealism was giving way to a "cynical realism," perhaps best represented by Reinhold Niebuhr (who had "so often been a bellwether in the social action movement" 114). By now, he was openly advocating the idea that some men can and must rule others (for the good of the ruled) and criticized St. Augustine for failing to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate subordination of man to man. This vision of man serving the state had been forseen and dreaded by Hilaire Belloc, but even he never imagined it would be promoted as a norm of Christian society. Rev. Opitz notes that, while the socialist cause had attracted many "noble and generous spirits precisely because they saw in it a social ideal which would end the subordination of man to man" (115), this new realization that it was actually the "road to serfdom" presaged an exodus by the idealists, which would leave the movement to those who merely sought power.
Other influential social gospelers were Harry F. Ward and J. Paul Tillich. Nicholas Berdyaev said "the school of Karl Barth favors socialism, and the religious socialism of Tillich even sympathizes with communism" (116). The Russian exile Berdyaev, although a man of deep religious conviction, "powerful mind and luminous insight," was deeply influenced by Karl Marx. He bought into the Marxist social diagnosis, while disagreeing on the cure. His 1933 book Christianity and Class War was dedicated to Marx, although by this time Berdyaev recognized Marx as his "fell enemy." Indeed, underlying all collectivist thought is the Hobbsian premise (later developed more fully by Marx and Darwin) that humans are essentially anti-social and would engage in unending fighting if it weren't for the restraining influence of the state. In this view, our true interests are necessarilly in conflict at all times and the state is required to impose order from above.
As against this view, Rev. Opitz reminds us of another theory of society developed by Leibniz, Adam Smith and Frederic Bastiat in which there can be social harmony. We are, after all, "members, one of another" (116). In this view, the "long range interests of members of society, rightly understood, do not conflict but are harmonious. Against this broad and deep background of social harmony there are occasional collisions of individual interest, and so to preserve harmony a limited government is needed to punish individuals who trespass on the person or property of others" (117).
Interesting side note: The cover story (on 'Happiness') of the current issue of The Economist magazine cited the 4 major modern social theorists as Smith, Darwin? (not sure on that, need to check out mag to summarize esp. art. on Pentacostals, so check this), Marx, Durkheim, (9 Jan 07). Hmmm, only one is pro-Christian (Smith).
Unfortunately, the ideas of Marx and Darwin relaunched the conception of society as a ceaseless struggle between antagonistic interests for existence and domination, of history as class warfare. "Once these ideas seep into the mind," a powerful, centralized force begins to seem necessary to suppress conflict and maintain order. It is in this tradition that "the germ of the idea of the totalitarian state appears" (117).
Although the author strongly disagrees with this view, he admits that it cannot be dismissed casually, especially since it is part of the thought of someone like Berdyaev, who has made a significant contribution to Christian social thought. Opitz recognizes the need to sincerely contend with these ideas and those, like Berdyaev, who hold them.
Rev. Opitz next discusses a new (in the 1950s) and unhealthy development in the area of Christian ethics. Moving away from the idea that we are simply to do what is right (with the understanding that this also happens to be in the best interest of our neighbors), the focus shifted to an obligation to meet the needs of our neighbors. This meant the existence of a need (anywhere in the world) could be used to justify the (coercive) placing of obligations onto others. This new concept of ethics was developed, among other places, in Paul Ramsay's 1952 book Basic Christian Ethics. "This curious interpretation of Jesus' commandment about loving our neighbor as ourselves, must practice discrimination on two levels. First, it must divide men up into two classes: neighbors and non-neighbors. The 'neighbors' are to be subsidized by government handouts while the non-neighbors are to be taxed to provide the subsidy. Secondly, there is discrimination between the needs of even those selected as 'neighbors.' The 'neighbor' may have illicit needs which even the most lenient welfare-stater would be reluctant to put within the domain of government dispensations" (118).
By this time (1950s), however, even the dominant welfare-statist consensus had begun to sense the possibility of some truth in the arguments of the opposition [hmm, perhaps opening the way for the conservative 'big 3': WFB's God and Man at Yale 1952, Witness 1952, tcm 1953]. At a 1953 symposium (which produced the book Goals of Economic Life) authorized by the Federal Council of Churches (and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation), even trendsetting Reinhold Niebuhr allowed (grudgingly) that libertarians do have a case to be made in this matter and are not merely the "minions of reaction," as he had earlier claimed. One topic of this seminar was the so-called "economic power" argument, which claims that political power can and should be used to offset "undue" concentrations of economic power. The first point to be made here is the distinction between these two types of power. For instance, can the "'power' by which a young lady of the theater impels young men to buy front row seats" be thought to be analogous to that which "can conscript young men to die on a battlefield half way around the world" (119)? In the author's view, economic and political power are of different types and it is improper to counterpose them in this way. However, even granting this balance-of-powers scheme, it is certainly better that both types of power not be in the hands of the state. This will allow those of us without either type to play them off against each other. "When the same set of hands that controls the police and the military also controls the money and means of production, then tyranny is as absolute as human inefficiency will allow" (120).
If the thought of welfare staters taking control of American policy weren't frightening enough, in chapter 6 (The Churches And The United Nations) the author illuminates their effort to establish their dogmas at the international level. In this arena too, the movement included (and still does today) both idealists seeking to bring (mistaken) Christian principles to politics and cynical realists seeking consolodation of power. In the minds of many sincere churchmen, the goals of the church and the UN became indistinguishable, and attacks on the UN became attacks on Christianity itself. Symbolic of this presumed synergy was the high profile participation of John Foster Dulles (Secretary of State during the Eisenhower administration) in the National Council of Churches. In effect, many of these ecclesiastical bureaucrats were (perhaps unwittingly) seeking to provide the State Department with a religious arm.
Rev. Opitz is careful to note that, as individuals, Christians are well within their rights in supporting the UN, but questions the attempt by certain leaders to portray this as the only properly "Christian" policy position. The pro-UN logic usually goes like this: "the UN is the only way to peace; the Church is for peace; therefore, the Church must give the UN its all-out support" (122). But the first clause of this syllogism is only as reliable as the claim that any government promotes peace and justice. The reality is that sometimes they do, but more often they don't. Given the history of our struggles keeping our own American state under control and properly limited, it is not at all clear that this could be effectively done at the international level. Rev. Opitz also notes that "despite the noble aspirations of many" U.N. supporters, the concept contains the seeds of "bigger and holier wars. The mentality behind the UN pumps messianic pressure into the old dream of world empire which seeks to establish one world of (our) law. This means eventual collision with a coalition of powers who want to be outside our law because they too are gripped with the delusion of one world of (their) law. These are the ingredients of religious wars, and they are of satanic inspiration" (122).
In reviewing the history of the Church, it is clear that she has, on occasion, allowed herself to become too closely associated with the state, sometimes usurping state functions, more often being used as an instrument of the state, but in all cases to her own eventual detriment. Rev. Opitz makes the interesting observation that, at the time of Constantine (the first such unhealthy union), "many features of the old Roman Empire survived their graft onto a stock radically different from the original" (122). He notes that "the Dutch theologian, Heering, dates what he calls the fall of Christianity from this period." He goes on, however, to note that "rulership has never been entirely secular. Every state has had to invoke some kind of religious sanction for its operations." While it appears to be in the natural (short-term) interest of both church and state to use the other to further their practical aims, there are more subtle snares to taking this approach. It brings out the worst in both as a kind of Gresham's Law takes over; the bad driving out the good. The end result is politicized (i.e. no longer genuine) religion [and of course religionized politics].
Part of the problem, says the author, is multiple definitions of the term "internationalism." Christianity is properly internationalist in its world missionary outreach, and ideas like free trade, free travel and the free exchange of ideas are closely related to this. However, these ideas (should) have very little to do with the secular, political idea of internationalism, which involves the standardization of coercive state methods worldwide, either through a UN or a world federal government. "Political schemes of redemption appear to many to hold more promise than religious ones" (123). The assumption seems to be that world political order and world community are the same thing, when in fact they are quite different. Political order presupposes community. "It has been one of the tragedies of our time that the faster the fabric of the world community has disintegrated, the more frantic have been the efforts to patch it up with gerry-built political structures." While some believe the instruments of empire can serve religion ("shades of theocratic imperialism"), the fact is "the church barely survived its first marriage with empire" (126).
"Religion is an important factor in building community, to the extent that world community is possible. Religion gave Christendom its unity" (124). Although NCC leaders claim virtually unanimous support among Christians for the idea that nations must surrender a measure of their sovereignty to achieve global peace and justice, this is far from the truth. The author then discusses the fact that intellectuals have always been susceptible to fadishness or trendiness in their thinking. "Those who entertain ideas like to have their mental furniture in the mode," and "the market in old ideas is always slow ... Always in the past some churchmen have sought and found religious sanctions for every form of misgovernment and every evil that has plagued society" (125). Yet the Church's function ought to be to patiently bear witness to the Truth, amid the changing winds of intellectually fashionable ideas, philosophies and doctrines. [I also think here of 2 quotes: he who marries the spirit of the age will soon be a widower, and Tony Blankley's observation that when you ask liberals to find the truth, they always come back with what's fashionable].
Some UN promoters (e.g. Dr. Walter Van Kirk) began as religionists and saw political internationalism as an instrument for religious ends. Others (e.g. John Foster Dulles) began as politicians and saw religious internationalism as an instrument for political ends. The former tended to brand those who oppose the UN as unchristian, the latter as isolationist. While we can't blame the many UN-boostering organizations for doing what they were set up to do (although we can question the merits of this goal), we can fault UN-boostering church organizations for deviating from their purported goal of doing church work. By allowing themselves to be used in this way, they lose any moral authority they might have had as church organizations. This has been an especially tragic development, given the many crucially important moral issues that have presented themselves during this century, most revolving around American involvement in major wars. Examples are:
- whether America should participate in these wars
- ethical questions on the way the wars were fought (level of appropriate force)
- atomic bombing of those [i.e. Japanese] "who had been trying for months to surrender, an act whose moral significance was largely ignored at the time" (129)
- the post-WWII expulsion of 18 million [Germanic] people from east Germany and Poland
- The Stalin-White-Morganthau plan for the decimation of Germany
- the war crimes trials of Europe and Japan
In all of these cases, churchmen as a rule spoke and acted in ways uncomfortably accommodating to the interests of the political elite in securing world hegemony and pushing toward world government via the UN.
Chapter 6 closes with a fascinating 1989 quote from Rev. Opitz: "After WWII, I began to sense the ways in which economics, politics and theology are mutually implicated; I understood for the first time why theology had once been called "The Queen of Sciences." I came to realize that many of the modern world's ills are due to the fact that politics (whose symbol is power) and economics (whose symbol is wealth) have usurped a role in our lives which borders on idolatry. This usurpation occurs because the western religious vision has dimmed; the dimension of transcendence is no longer a vibrant part of modern temper. Such are among the consequences of embracing certain unsound ideas popular during the past couple of centuries."
In chapter 7 (The Libertarian Theology Of Freedom), the author notes "a widespread and well-founded apprehension" in society, the result of the failure of WWII to secure peace, despite the promises of our leaders to win our efforts. He worried that the cold war pitted the West against a much more powerful and alluring enemy than we faced in WWII (by now a happily dated concern). He notes, however, that the enemy's "trump card" has been to force us to become like them (e.g. collectivistic, centralized) in order to fight them. Even if this enemy should disappear, he says prophetically, "we would then have to contend with an overgrown political establishment whose activities intrude into every aspect of our economy and frustrate individuals" (134) at every turn. "The original balance of our system has been destroyed through the seizure of power by the executive and by the virtual defection of the other two branches of our government." In addition to moving toward the rule of men vs. law, the Income Tax Amendment has legitimized the state's claim to essentially all (a portion determined by it) wealth produced in the nation. It has furthermore "confiscated gold, perfected a method of converting the public debt into paper dollars; and employs ... inflation to dilute the value of our currency" (134, see also Ferguson's The Cash Nexus).
Because "these unreasonable things have to be made plausible to people if the rulers are to remain in power," a new class of "experts" has emerged to tell the ordinary man what to think and how to act. The latter naturally retains the "priviledge" of paying the bills. But the crisis is not in communism, the rule of men, the state's newfound power of the purse or the new experts. The crisis is within man himself; the belief that the individual no longer counts in view of the perceived triumph of mass man. In the presence of big business, big labor, big government, etc., the individual is tempted to blend in with the crowd, to play it safe, to "adopt any sort of camouflage which will conceal - even from ourselves - the fact that each of us is a unique personality, responsible ultimately to his Maker" (137).
The original American spirit of self-reliance has "given way to a reliance on authority." Too many have come to "know their place," to be "confused by world events," and to "accept the contradictory promises of their leaders." In short, they have "surrendered their prerogatives" as individuals standing before God. This creates the "pathetic situation of 100 million adult persons ... each one stultified by the feeling that he can't do anything about society, government or world conditions" (146). But to think of human destiny is to usher us into the realm of religion. Jesus taught that our destiny is in our own hands, that "the Kingdom of God is within you (or within your reach)," and is "at hand - now." "This is the gospel ... to which the ancient world responded and to which we might respond again, now, anytime." Tocqueville said of early Americans that "they became a new breed with the discovery that they were free." He recognized that this discovery came via the Christian faith [see also Lane's Discovery of Freedom].
The collectivist "superstition" asserts that, while an individualist outlook may have been appropriate in a simpler time, the increasing complexity of society requires that the group be given precedence. One sign of this thinking is the idea of Society, spelled with a capital S. This is merely an idol constructed to justify tyranny. "Society is nothing but the persons who compose it" (139). "We are social creatures, and we achieve our full humanity only in association, in mutuality, and in community," but voluntary association "withers and dies in the presence of compulsion." Although it may seem harmless (or even Christian) to urge individuals to dedicate themselves to the welfare of the group, "no one reflecting on the matter can fail to see that the welfare of the group cannot be at variance with the well-being of the individuals who comprise the group." The ominous aspect arises with the claim that someone should be given the rights to define "the common good" and to force submission to it (this is the usual meaning of the code-phrase "social reform"). Christian service must be voluntary, with individuals retaining the right to both define and contribute to "the common good."
A variant of the collectivist superstition admits that individuals are important, but claims that strong government leadership is necessary to coordinate their efforts and achieve significant results. In this view, "it is government that binds us all together and gives us stature" (141). A modern version of this idea is expressed in Wiliam Kristol's neo-conservative idea of "national greatness," involving large, expensive and grandiose programs of world improvement which are to be planned and coordinated by government. Kristol expresses disdain for the libertarian "leave us alone" coalition resisting such centralized planning [term coined by Grover Norquist]. But instead of Society, this is merely Government, another idol. There is no such thing as Government (except in the minds of men), only fellow citizens who work in government ("an arrangement which sets aside a small group of people and gives them the power to coerce all the rest of the people"). According to our nation's founders, the best that could be said of government is that it is "a necessary evil" [Washington?: like fire; a dangerous servant, a fearsome master]. Its proper place in the affairs of men is spelled out in our Declaration of Independence; "to protect individuals in their God-given individual rights," not only leaving them alone but making sure others leave them alone as well [Jefferson: to prevent men from injuring one another, and leave them otherwise free to pursue their schemes of improvement...].
The American founders were not anarchists. "They conceived a government which was to be, in its concern for justice, more vigorous than any government had ever been. They wanted the function of this government limited to the protection of the equal rights of every man in freedom, not coming into play except when some individual trespassed on these rights of another. Within the limits set by a Higher Law, they wanted government to be virile and alert; but they erected safeguards that were intended to prevent government from stepping outside these limitations" (142-3). In contrast, we moderns seem content to trust government to limit itself, ignoring the facts of history in this regard. The preposterous claims of government can easily be seen to be the sheer fraud they are. Although it promises much, it cannot give what it does not have, and it has nothing except what it takes from others. While it offers for sale Robin Hood's (immoral) theory (rob the rich to pay the poor), its practice is more like rob them all to pay Robin Hood.
The root problem beneath the superstitions about society or government is the modern secular or non-religious view of life. "It is the fundamental premise of religion that each man has a relation to the heart of Reality which overshadows in importance his relation to any merely human creation" (144). Secularism is unrealistic (it ignores the God-man link) and impractical ("look at the mess we're in!"). The tyranny of the group over the individual is assured if there is only the group and the individual; it only makes sense. But with God added to the picture, everything is changed; "every individual is then linked to a higher Reality and becomes a person in his own right with prerogatives that his society may not transgress" (145).
The good news is that, although communism and other secular "faiths" try [see Michael Burleigh's Earthly Powers], they can never satisfy man's incurably religious nature. The solution awaits for each of us to face the facts about ourselves and our situation, making an individual commitment to align ourselves to God and Reality. As more individuals make this choice and are transformed, society will also be transformed. As Os Guiness concludes in Time For Truth: "The choice is ours. So also will be the consequences."
AMZN: Faith/Freedom synergy defended by a philosophical warrier
I'm afraid its true that many (most?) of my fellow Christians have an insufficient appreciation not only of the Christian roots of freedom, but of the secular/atheistic roots of socialism, including American welfare-statism. This book is a great resource for setting them straight on both counts. The writings in this book were compiled by Charles Hallberg from three earlier books by Rev. Opitz: The Powers That Be (1956), The Kingdom Without God (1956) and Religion: Foundation of a Free Society (1996). Rev. Opitz is a former Congregational parish minister and has been a spokesman for libertarian Christians since 1951, primarily associated with the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE), founded by Leonard Read. Opitz represents the best of the Puritan (and later Congregational) spirit of a clear thinking, rational and intellectual approach to the ways theology should speak to our culture.